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I. INTRODUCTION
Journalists often seek access to places (other than courtrooms) owned
or controlled by the government or private parties. This access furthers the
news-gathering enterprise.
Accordingly, the media often assert that the first amendment protects
these efforts. When journalists enter such places, however, they invade the
rights of the owners. Private parties' interests in privacy and property are
violated. In addition, the government's responsibility to properly perform its
function is hampered and governmental property interests infringed by such
invasions. This conflict raises the issue of whether under the press clause of
the first amendment' the media, as journalists and the employers of jour-
nalists, have a sufficiently strong interest in access to overcome the conflicting
private and governmental interests. This Article explores the problem created
by this conflict of asserted rights.
The Supreme Court has adumbrated the doctrine that the media has the
same right under the press clause of the first amendment that the general
public enjoys. This doctrine, however, has not been articulated in a way that
totally precludes some special consideration for the media.2 In Branzburg v.
Hayes,3 the Court held that reporters had no constitutional privilege to with-
hold from a grand jury information attained from confidential sources. The
1. The first amendment provides in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...... U.S. CoNsr. amend.
I. This guarantee was first applied to the states as incorporated by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. See Anderson, The Origin of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455,
459-60 (1983).
3. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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media was held to have no greater first amendment right than the public. In
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,4 the Court held that the same standards apply
for search warrants against the media as for those against the public. In
three cases in which the media sought access to jails and prisons, Pell v.
Procunier,5 Saxbe v. Washington Post Company,6 and Houchins v. KQED,
Inc. , the Court held that the media has no greater constitutional right of
access to penal institutions than the public.8 Thus explicated, the doctrine
denies journalists any extensive right of access to places and essentially amal-
ganates all first amendment rights into a single unitary right.9
The Supreme Court decisions do not preclude conferring on the media
a right sufficient to fulfill the media function. The Court in Branzburg
recognized that its doctrine might not fully protect the media.10 In his im-
portant concurring opinion, Justice Powell, who supplied the fifth vote for
the majority, asserted that the doctrine would be subject to review if the
media were unduly inhibited. Properly understood, the prison access cases
support the same view.12 In Houchins, a badly fragmented Court did not
render an opinion of the Court, failed to definitely address the right of the
4. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
5. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
6. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
7. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
8. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974).
9. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) asserting the press "merit[s] special mention simply because
it [has] been more often the object of official restraint." Justice Burger noted that
freedom of speech and freedom of the press were originally thought of as inter-
changeable. Id. at 799-800; see also L. LEvy, EmmRGENCE OF A FREE PREss (1985)
(updating LEGAcY OF SUPPRESSION (1960)). Other scholars agree with this view that
the framers intended to create one unified right, the freedom of expression, encom-
passing both the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. See, e.g., Lange,
The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. Rnv. 77, 88-95 (1975); Lewis, A Preferred
Position for Journalism?, 7 HoFsTRA L. REv. 595, 599 (1979); Nimmer, Introduction
- Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy; What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?,
26 HAsTNGs L.J. 639, 641 (1975); see also Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause,
30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 460 (1983); Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63
VA. L. Rv. 731, 782-83 (1977); Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special
Constitutional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HoFsTRA L. REy. 629 (1979).
At times this seems to argue for absolute protection of the media.
10. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 706-08 (1972).
11. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
12. Compare Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) with Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). Both cases are discussed infra at note 78 and accompanying
text. The equality concept does allow a slight functional preference. The equality
concept does not requires the exact same treatment, but treatment that is equivalent.
See infra note 52. This Article by, its emphasis makes it appear, at least in part, that
these include many or mostly difficult situations. This is not so. Journalists routinely
receive preference in press pools, news conferences, and reporters' galleries - all
reflecting in practice this slight preference.
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media, and, in concurring and dissenting opinions, provided support for a
functional right for the media.
These opinions utilize arguments based on the constitutional principle
of freedom to speak or publish without inhibitions as well as arguments
based on constitutional policy which promote information gathering and
transmitting functions of the media. 3 The policy argument turns on the
premise that the government's right to limit people's access to government-
owned or privately-owned and government-controlled places is circumscribed
by its role as servant of the citizens. Restrictions can occur only to further
the efficiency of government operations. Otherwise the public need for in-
formation requires access to government facilities. The media must be pro-
vided priority access when circumstances dictate the restriction of those wishing
to enter a place, or else government operations will be unseen and unchecked.
Careful scrutiny of justifications for exclusions must be given when the public
and the media are excluded in order to assure the media is treated in such
a way as to be able to do its job effectively. Essentially, the issue is whether
the media can function as the media within the restrictions imposed.
General approaches to constitutional interpretation support this slight
functional preference for the media. Beyond the first amendment principle
of autonomy in speaking and publishing, the press clause provides a deriv-
ative policy-based right to gather information for dissemination.1 4 Concepts
of equality, both as a jurisprudential theory 5 and as developed in media
cases,' 6 further support a differential treatment. A theory follows that gives
a substantially stronger rationale for this media preference than other the-
ories.17
After developing this theory, the Article turns to the Supreme Court
cases treating different media differently within a complete first amendment
13. The idea of principle and policy follows Professor Ronald Dworkin's
theories. See generally R. DwoRKI, TAKING RxsrTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
14. See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 53-74 (differential treatment of various media) and note
51 (need for electronic media to use cameras), and accompanying text. Electronic
journalists must have cameras and recording equipment in the same way that print
journalists must have their notepads.
17. This application of the interpretation demonstrates the viability of the
theory of slight media preference in access to places, but hardly in every conceivable
situation. The argument of this Article does not diminish the value of free speech.
Just as the media must be informed to fulfill its purposes, so must the citizen. A
functional difference does exist, however. The media informs a wider spectrum of
society than does the individual by speaking. This aspect of the media function
furthers the citizen's fulfillment of his obligation, and privileges and rights. Accord-
ingly, the first amendment, particularly its discrete speech and press clauses, fully
supports a slight functional preference for the media right without denying the equal
dignity of the public speech right.
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right. These cases demonstrate that the Court's jurisprudence supports dif-
ferential treatment. Next, cases involving access (both to gather and transmit
information) to government facilities are considered. These are analyzed to
clarify the right of government over its property. When considered within
the interpretive theory of this Article, the cases support a doctrine which
permits the media a functional preference. Finally, cases involving access to
private property are considered. These cases demonstrate the viability of this
Article's thesis in that context.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. General Theory
An inquiry into the rights of the journalist requires that the press clause
be construed and its relationship to other rights be considered. Such an effort
requires consideration of a range of approaches to constitutional interpre-
tation." However, this Article focuses in particular on two basic theories of
interpretation.
The language of the text is the basic source for interpreting our written
Constitution. 9 It provides the understandings and meanings from which we
begin and also confers (in our epoch and society) legitimacy to the Consti-
tution and its interpretation. This legitimacy is essential to the Constitution
and other law in our society. Of course, the text also carries uncertainty. It
is interpreted by readers. The readers are bound by the text in a way that is
determined by the ethos, practices and understanding of the reader's culture. 20
The meanings of its words vary with time. Nevertheless, it serves as a sort
of constant and a guide, even though one of less than total stability or
certainty.
Furthermore, the text is a framing device that provides a sort of negative
guidance by establishing parameters of possible meaning, rather than a pre-
cise or exact meaning. "[W]e. . .do best to look at constitutional language
18. An enormous outpouring of scholarly commentary has recently illumi-
nated this concept of constitutional interpretation. It has been provoked in part by
the poverty of text-bound and historic interpretation in difficult cases. The writers
have used other scholarly disciplines to explain the Constitution as interpreted in the
context of the total experience and understanding of the interpreter. One reads and
understands based upon his experience. This function is central to interpretation. This
Article views interpretive theory as essential to an understanding of media rights but
merely surveys the range of approaches. The theory is not developed in a strong sense
beyond that use.
19. Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. R-v. 797,
798-99 (1982).
20. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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as a frame without a picture, or, better yet, a blank canvas. We know when
we have gone off the edge of the canvas even though the canvas itself gives
us no guidance as to what to put on it. ''21 Thus, the first amendment estab-
lishes an extremely strong and clear freedom to speak and publish. However,
the text does not provide details of that freedom. In the instance of the press
clause, the text permits the details to rattle about within the frame. Other
interpretive devices must be deployed.
The text, in addition to establishing parameters, is a source of principles
for interpretation.22 Individual cases or problems must be approached by
applying these principles even though exact or precise rules do not exist. In
order to resolve issues in cases not fully addressed by principles, policy
considerations must be developed and applied. The principle of the first
amendment is that one may publish or say what he wishes without govern-
ment hindrance before publication. 23 Both the press and the public have the
21. Schauer, supra note 19, at 828.
22. See R. DwomxN, A MATnrR op PRINCIPLE (1985). Professor Dworkin
states:
Justifications of principle argue that a particular rule is necessary in order
to protect an individual right that some person (or perhaps group) has against
other people, or against the society or government as a whole. Antidiscri-
mination laws, like the laws that prohibit prejudice in employment or hous-
ing, can be justified on arguments of principle: individuals do have a right
not to suffer in the distribution of such important resources because others
have contempt for their race.
Justifications of policy, on the other hand, irgue that a particular rule
is desirable because that rule will work in the general interest, that is, for
the benefit of the society as a whole. Government subsidies to certain farm-
ers, for example, may be justified, not on the ground that these farmers
have any right to special treatment, but because it is thought that giving
subsidies to them will improve the economic welfare of the community as
a whole. Of course, a particular rule may be justified by both sorts of
arguments. It may be true, for example, both that the very poor have a
right to free medical treatment and that providing treatment for them will
work for the general interest because it will provide a healthier labor force.
Id. at 375. See generally, R. DwoRKm, supra note 13. Consider Professor Dworkin's
discussion of the famous Riggs v. Palmer case. Id. at 123. A court without a particular
rule controlling the issue confronts the issue of whether a killer may inherit as a result
of his homicide. The court applies the principle that one may not benefit from one's
own wrong. It uses the policy analysis that permitting inheritance would frustrate the
principle.
23, For a discussion of the first amendment, see R. DwoRxIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 381-97 (1985). Professor Dworkin discusses the general problem addressed
by this Article. Id. at 385-90. "[Ihe historically central function of the First Amend-
ment,... is simply to ensure that those who wish to speak on matters of political
or social controversy are free to do so." Id. at 385. Professor Dworkin further states:
Theories concerned to protect the audience generally make what I have called
an argument of policy for free speech and free press. They argue, that is,
that a reporter must have certain powers, not because he or anyone else is
[Vol. 52
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right to speak and to publish virtually without censorship. This principle
constitutes the fundamental value of the first amendment, and informs our
understanding of the first amendment.
In Branzburg v. Hayes,24 the Court followed this approach in denying
journalists greater constitutional immunity from grand jury inquiries than
the general public. The Court observed that its holding did not restrict the
right to publish. The opinion then considered and rejected the argument that
the lack of privilege against testifying would inhibit news-gathering. Justice
Powell in his concurrence developed a point made by the majority. He ob-
served that the Court did "not hold that newsmen. . . are without consti-
tutional rights with respect to the gathering of news, ' 25 and that subpoenas
without proper purpose which disrupted news-gathering should be quashed.
In Branzburg and elsewhere the Court recognized the relationship of the
right to publish and the need for a right to gather information. The important
information gathering right is derived by policy argument from the funda-
mental right to publish. 26 In order to publish, the media must gather infor-
mation. The right to publish establishes the media's additional function of
transmitting information to the public. This information-gathering function
derives from the first amendment right to publish and the broader ethos of
American democracy. It fulfills the need for the dissemination of information
to the citizenry which is essential to the American democratic understanding.
Since access to places is essential to gathering information, this access must
be afforded some protection. Beyond the need for an informed citizenry, the
checking value also exists under the first amendment. 27 The checking value
exists because "the abuse of official power is an especially serious evil"' 28
which regards "the general populace [as the] ultimate judge of the behavior
of public officials."' 29 Under this theory the citizen not only needs and uses
information to act as an informed citizen in the political community, but
also to effectively contain official misconduct.30 Indeed, while the checking
value analysis accommodates other first amendment values, it maintains that
entitled to a special protection, but to secure some benefit to the community
as a whole....
Id. at 386 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450, 452 (1938).
24. 408 U.S. 665.
25. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
27. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
Fouir . R.Es. J. 521. The checking value is a complement of first amendment theory,
"a possible supplement to, not a substitute for, the values that have been at the
center of twentieth-century thinking about the First Amendment." Id. at 528.
28. Id. at 538.
29. Id. at 542.
30. See id. at 538-44.
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the evil of official misconduct is of a special order, antithetical to the Amer-
ican political arrangement. Its containment and prevention take precedence
over "all other goals of the political system."31
Policy arguments must fill the lacunae of the first amendment. Within
this principle the Court has found that the media and public have the same
first amendment right. Policy considerations govern needs collateral to and
furthering of the principal publication. Nevertheless, the same right does not
mandate the same treatment, but rather equality of treatment.3 2 This requires
a consideration of the information-gathering aspect of the first amendment.
A right to gather information makes the right to speak or publish more
effective, it provides information about government and it serves a checking
function on governmental misconduct.
B. Particular Approaches
1. The Text
The text of the first amendment is a powerful statement of principle
favoring unhindered speech and publication. This principle attaches especially
to the media via the press clause. However, neither the amendment itself nor
its content provides an unambiguous interpretation of the press clause. A
reading of the amendment, the Bill of Rights, or the entire Constitution
supports two conclusions: either the press clause is an emphasis (perhaps
redundant) of the first amendment or the press clause states a separate right
of some sort, a right for the media supplemental to the rights established by
the speech clause.
2. Text and History
Our conventions of textual interpretation require that we accord great
weight to the historic background of the text. History supports the view that
the principle protecting publication centrally informs first amendment doc-
trine. Certainly the drafters of the amendment wanted to preserve the English
protection against prior restraint. The language they chose accommodates
this interpretive view, but it supports a broader construction based on policy
considerations as well. 3
The text strongly suggests and history supports the view that the drafters
wrote the press clause consciously. The original draft of the first amendment
31. Id. at 558 (footnote omitted).
32. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
33. L. LEVY, supra note 9, at 276.
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protected the press more explicitly than does the adopted text.14 Contem-
poraneous state constitutions contained press clauses and sometimes omitted
speech clauses. 31 While this knowledge does not reveal the precise or partic-
ular meaning of the clause or the related weight of the press and speech
clauses, it suggests a somewhat different perception of the role of the media
and speech by the public in society.
The textual-historic analysis propounds a position both profound and
somewhat paradoxical and ambiguous. No matter where the analysis places
the marker protecting the media against prior restraint or seditious libel, case
law developing freedom-of-expression theory has passed beyond that mark.
The press in England had been subject at the time of drafting to recent
censorship and regulation. Political theory in Britain, which influenced the
drafters of our Constitution, suggests a special concern for the press. 36 The
history, however, gives no precise indication of the scope of that concern or
how the media today is to be treated. While this suggests a special concern
for the press, it is still quite consistent with that history to conclude that the
press clause was written to emphasize that written words were to be protected
to the same extent as oral speech. 3 7 History demonstrates only that a sub-
stantially serious regard for the press existed; its precise content is unclear.
The development of first amendment theory likewise demonstrates that
history aids only in establishing a general principle. First amendment speech
doctrine has developed in modem times largely as a unitary doctrine including
the speech and press clauses, not separate theories for the two clauses. It has
extended beyond any scope that can be ascribed with certainty to the first
amendment's reach in 1791. The two clauses have come to have the same
rather expansive meaning. Precise guidance to the meaning of the text cannot
be educed from history, but only solicitude for unhindered publication and
the media's role in doing so.
34. Madison originally proposed the following amendment in 1789: "The
people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish
their sentiments; and the freedom of press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty,
shall be inviolable." Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rv.
455, 478 (1983).
35. The original constitution in each of the following states contained a press
clause: Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Car-
olina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. Only Pennsylvania included a
speech clause in addition to the press clause. Id. at 464-65. For a discussion of these
provisions in the state constitutions, see generally 1 B. ScmVARTz, Tim BrL OF
RiGHTs: A DoctrnMwARY HIsToRY (1971). The state constitutions asserted a balance
between free press and the police power. The community interest or private interests
would be protected.
36. See, e.g., Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Expression
in Early American History, 37 STAr. L. REv. 795, 821-34 (1985).
37. See Nimmer, Introduction - Is Freedom of the Press A Redundancy:
What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAsTn Ns L.J. 639, 640-41 (1975).
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The lack of clear answers from text or history creates a problem and
an opportunity. It challenges the legitimacies of judicial interpretations of
the Constitution. It forces us to understand that our culture and its as-
sumptions shape interpretation.
3. Our Cultural and Societal Frame
Cultural assumptions and understandings change constantly as political,
social and technological expectations change. This understanding and limi-
tation are vital. Certainly electronics, computers and such have changed the
way we view the media under the first amendment. The increased number
of women in the legal profession may modify the way laws and constitutions
are interpreted because women view conflict resolution differently from men.38
Our political culture's constant movement toward openness and communi-
cation contributes to society's expectation of being informed. The develop-
ment of case law itself creates some constitutional protection. Analysis of
legal theories supports other doctrines. Consideration of the various needs
of beneficiaries of the press clause makes clear the need for still other rights
for the media. Political, jurisprudential and other theories suggest even more.
The unique American insistence on openness of government likewise
informs our view of the press clause. The freedom of information statutes
and the government in the sunshine statutes both at the federal and state
level articulate and emphasize our need, perhaps compulsion, for openness.
This manifestation, however, is based on a broader understanding of the
need for information. Information is needed for the citizen to participate in
government, to check government, and for each individual to enjoy the self-
fulfillment basic to human dignity. All are fundamental to the American
understanding of democracy, and should-and do-inform our reading of
the Constitution. These aspects of our society directly and indirectly influence
constitutional interpretation and argue for a slight preference for the media.
The need, the desire, and the demand of American democracy for effective
communication of and access to information demand a slight preference for
the media.
Judicial interpretation must have legitimacy. 9 Our society demands it.
To function as a constitutional authority, or indeed a legal one, the courts
38. Karst, Women's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447.
39. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CouRT, TuE CONSTITunoN AND HumAN RITS
ix-xi (1982) (the problem is briefly discussed as a central one); see also Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN L. REv. 739, 749 (1982) (arguing that the effort for a
legitimate approach "turns on objectivity rather than correctness").
This theory requires that the notion of correctness be subordinated to the notion
of objectivity. The correct meaning of the Constitution cannot be ascertained. An
[Vol. 52
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and the Supreme Court must be perceived and regarded as legitimate. 40 Ac-
cordingly, judges interpret in a way that both they and society (or judges'
perception of society) regard as legitimate. Since our society, and judges in
our society, regard the language of the text as centrally important and the
history of that text as substantially important (at least in the present epoch),
they are touchstones of legitimacy.
The role of constitutional text as central to political life and of free
speech as vital to democracy might have a different meaning in another
society with our legal and political culture. This difference emphasizes the
usefulness of policy considerations in interpreting language whose meaning
may vary. Thus England, the primary source of our culture and of our legal
and political institutions, takes a substantially different view of constitutional
text and of freedom of speech and press than does America. Indeed, no
constitutional text exists in Britain. Accordingly, the common law and tra-
dition determine constitutional norms. They accommodate a different view
of freedom of speech and of the press. Injunction against publications and
extensive government secrecy are thought consistent with freedom of speech
in England.41 Consider the views of a contemporary British media critic:
Unfortunately, the idea that [governmental] authority is engaged in a con-
spiracy against the citizenry fits neatly into another ideology of our day, the
doctrine of media triumphalism. The idea that the journalist is, or ought to
be, a legally and morally privileged member of society and entitled to place
himself above the law emanates from America. [I] heard one supporter of
this new credo state, quite seriously, that a reporter would be justified in
breaking into someone's house to obtain information which, in his opinion,
the public had a right to know. I don't know whether our own media
triumphalists would go so far but certainly they seem to be advancing the
view that journalists, or at any rate editors, are better judges of what con-
stitutes a legitimate state secret than a democratically-elected govern-
ment....
objective one can.
Objectivity in the law connotes standards. It implies that an interpretation
can be measured against a set of norms that transcend the particular vantage
point of the person offering the interpretation. Objectivity implies that the
interpretation can be judged by something other than one's own notions of
correctness. It imparts a notion of impersonality. The idea of an objective
interpretation does not require that the interpretation be wholly determined
by some source external to the judge, but only that it be constrained.
Id. at 744. Professor Fiss states the basis of legitimacy which this Article attempts
to implement in stating that objective, rational arguments could flow from the la5-
guage of the text.
40. See R. DwonxIN, LAw's Emn 190-92 (1986).
41. See, e.g., British Steel Corp. v. Grenada, 3 W.L.R. 774 (1980) (state-
owned British Steel Corporation sought to enjoin the showing of a critical television
program based on illicitly obtained material).
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Having worked with journalists all my adult life I would hate to live in a
country where they were accorded, de jure or even de facto, privileged status.
The doctrine of media triumphalism is, in my view, a much greater prac-
tical threat to the liberties of ordinary folk in this country than anything
a parliamentary government is likely to cook up. Media people attribute to
themselves all kinds of altruistic motives, and often claim to be more trust-
worthy custodians of the national interest than the government elected to
preserve it. But then so do go-getting businessmen who evade Board of
Trade regulations. The truth is, the media are motivated chiefly by the
pursuit of circulations and ratings, and those who serve this by the desire
to acquire money, fame and power. They are entitled to their self-esteem,
even their self-complacency. What they are not entitled to do is to break
the law of the land. 42
However, neither the English nor I hesitate in asserting that freedom of
speech and press flourish as fundamental English liberties. The concept of
freedom of speech and press, if no less real, is different in its meaning in
England. This analysis has its limits. It describes how decision-making is
affected by factors beyond formally articulated ones. It does not predict
exactly how the factors will function or offer rules of interpretation that
establish a particular conclusion. Nevertheless, what has been offered surfaces
factors that do influence interpretation and offer means of approach. Indeed,
the most important contribution of this scholarship is demonstrating that
multiple approaches to interpretation exist and that these approaches to in-
terpretation are permissible. 43 Within this context, policy arguments must
determine a doctrine for the first amendment. An argument that takes ac-
count of the entire ethos that supports our judicial and political understand-
ing must be deployed.
4. The Particular Influences of Technology and Language Change on the
Interpretation of the Press Clause
Change in the meanings of words and in technology have had a parti-
cularily profound effect. Both the interpretation of a text and the use of
history are constrained by language. Language changes. The Constitution's
meaning cannot be constant and precise when the meanings of its words
42. Johnson, Beware Media Triumphalism, 258 Tm SPECTATOR 21 (1987)
(regular press commentary).
43. This understanding does not assume or assert any particular mode of
interpretation; rather the effort leads to the conclusion that one must utilize many
approaches and not an overriding method or (narrow) theory of interpretation. This
effort requires consideration of the literal text and history, but more importantly,
presents a larger argument based on case law, political and jurisprudential theory
and other factors analyzed through an informed (legal, philosophical, etc.) judgment.
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change. Consequently, the meaning expressed by the words varies extremely. 44
Newspapers, which are essentially printed from computer input of journalists,
and television, an electronic press, are profoundly different from the press
of 1789. 4 1 The word press encompasses these and much more. This broad-
ening of the concept of the press must be directly confronted in interpreting
the press clause.
The word media rather than press is used in this Article when referring
to the press clause's beneficiary. This usage reflects the change in the meaning
of the word press.46 Media also captures more vividly the diversity and rich-
ness of those who today stand in the position occupied by the press in 1791.47
- Media must be defined to further the interpretation of the press clause
effort. A broad definition best describes what constitutes the modem media.
Media includes essentially all who communicate to the public in accordance
with the concept of the core publication function protected by the first
amendment. 48 This definition includes the pamphleteer49 and the scholar in
44. See P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF TE CONSTITUTION 14-
19 (1982) (discussing W. CORBET, POLrcs AND THE CONsTrTUIoN, and providing a
vivid demonstration of the problem of changing language).
45. Moreover, the way technology and words have changed has modified how
we look at things generally, and contributes to uncertainty of interpretation based
on text and history. People who knew manual presses in a world of horses and
buggies think differently about the word press and the phrase freedom of the press
than do people who use word processors, look at and rely on television, and fly
across the seas. The two words of 1789 and 1987 are different in ways which cannot
be explicitly expressed in terms of constitutional interpretation.
46. Press means something different today than it did in 1791. Indeed, it was
only referred to as the press in 1791. Press alluded directly to the printing press and
its function. It had similarities to our press and media, and the roots of our media
can be traced to the era of constitutional creation. Still, the eighteenth-century press
and contemporary media differ profoundly. Today press alludes to both a broad,
complex institution and to isolated individuals. Large, geographically dispersed press
organizations had not developed in 1791 and television and other electronic media
that did not exist in 1791 are the entities that often concern us now. While the press
of 1791 was more than pamphleteers, it was less (physically and otherwise) or, more
accurately, very different than today. The changes in the meaning of press and the
nature of media profoundly effect the interpretive effort. Accordingly, this Article
uses the word media rather than press.
47. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, GOvERNMEN AND MASS COmmuNICATIONS 35 (1947)
(a relatively early recognition of the need for an expanded understanding of the press
clause).
48. See Abrams, The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and
the Autonomous Press, 7 HoFSrRA L. Rnv. 563, 581-83 (1979). The press would
include free-lance writers, radio and television stations, magazines, academics and
any other person in connection with dissemination to the public of a newspaper,
book, broadcast or other form of communications. Id. at 581-82 (citing Office of
Media Liaison, White House Press Office, Carter Administration, Stanford Daily
Announcement 3-4 (Dec. 13, 1978)). Mr. Abrams would, apparently, exclude pam-
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addition to the broadcast and print media. This definition makes a slight
functional preference for the media under the first amendment press clause
more compelling. It clearly protects a class, the pamphleteer, who benefited
from the press clause in the 18th century but might not uncter a narrow
definition of the press as the institutional press. The definition also disperses
the right existing under the press clause among those who have use for the
right. This expansive view of the media is in greater accord with the Supreme
Court doctrine of equal treatment of the public and the media. The idea that
the media should receive a functional preference is thus more acceptable.
Nevertheless, some limit must be placed on press clause protection. The
various media members are included only in their communication function. 50
A person or entity is within the meaning of media under the press clause
only when it publishes with the intent to communicate. For journalists, this
is most of the time; scholars, much; the operator of a computer bulletin
board, arguably less; and pamphleteer on a single issue, rather little. Under
this definition, the press clause protects a broader and more diverse range
of people. This attenuation and its attendant expansion of protection support
the weak preference for the media along lines suggested by this Article. The
definition also will require careful distinctions both between media and non-
media functions and among media within the scope of the press clause.
This Article, however, realistically rejects broad views of media privilege
in excess of that of the public. Certainly it rejects broad views of the media
as the agent of the people or the essence of democracy. The journalists and
their companies are not "best qualified" at anything save being journalists
and media businesses. Journalists write and speak when they report by paper
or electronically. They convey information via their companies as a primary
task of reporting; they also editorialize and comment and some of this no
doubt merges into the reporting of news. These thing are protected by the
first amendment. But journalists do more. They earn a living, and their
companies reap profits. They no doubt edify themselves to some degree, and
enjoy a psychic income. These very important aspects of being a journalist,
or a company, are not protected (directly) by the first amendment. The
phleteers. Id. at 581-82. This Article would include these when they communicate to
the public. See infra note 49.
49. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937), wherein the court stated:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily includes pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic
weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and
others in our history abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion.
Id. at 452; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
50. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 48, at 581-83.
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amendment does protect the right to speak or to publish. Journalists primarily
communicate information. The recipient of the information, the public, at-
taches what importance it chooses to that information. The citizenry then
determines whether malfeasance, for example, or some other circumstance
exists and what political action will follow. The media facilitates and perhaps
focuses that action by the transmission of information. No doubt the media
discovers and develops information. It is a vital participant, but it does not
determine what the public should do with the information.
5. Conclusion-Interpretation and the Press Clause
The text of the first amendment, by treating the press or media in a
separate clause, clearly supports a slight preference for the media. History
buttresses this view. The state constitutions of the era are focused on press
protection. Seditious libel strongly implicated the press, and political theory
was aware of and very favorably inclined toward greater press protection.
Our contemporary society and culture and the evolution of the press into
present-day media support a slight preference for the media. Methods of
constitutional interpretation enhance this view by clearly demonstrating the
propriety, the legitimacy and the need for granting the media a slight pref-
erence under the press clause of the first amendment. This Article further
develops the rationale of that conclusion and its application to actual situa-
tions.
Once this is fully understood and properly taken account of, the Court
should grant a functional preference to the media over the public for access
to places.
III. TBE RATIONALE FOR DiF-E rr TREATMENT
A. Introduction
First amendment doctrine recognizes that the various media must be
treated somewhat differently under the first amendment. This doctrine re-
mains a constant despite Supreme Court decisions mandating the same or
equal treatment for the media and the public under the first amendment
without regard to the separate speech and press clauses. The two branches
of the doctrine are consistent because equality of treatment need not mean
the same treatment. Justice Stewart's Houchins concurrence provocatively
explicates the issue of the appropriate treatment of KQED. How can a tel-
evision station exercise first amendment rights equal to those of the print
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media without using cameras? 5' That it cannot is apparent (although the
Court does not embrace or discuss this view).
The public and the press enjoy first amendment protection. However,
this means that courts should treat them as distinct individuals or entities
with distinct needs. This is equality of treatment.5 2 Identical treatment denies
the distinct needs of the public and the media, and of each medium, and
effectively limits the first amendment rights of the media. For the media to
be treated as equals, they must be afforded the ability to participate and
contribute to the "uninhibited, robust, and wide open" debate required by
the first amendment.53 Such a grant of rights is consistent with equality of
the media and the public under the first amendment. Other approaches,
including the current Supreme Court doctrine, effectively render the media
nonfunctional, do not treat them equally, and do not actually grace them
with equal first amendment rights. In order to fulfill the promise of the press
clause, the media must be granted the particular rights sufficient to perform
their function. Policy arguments must fashion the first amendment protection
of the public and the media, and of each medium, according to the nature
and the extent of their needs. The media must have the use of the tools of
its trade. Camera, pens, pencils and paper are required in order for the media
to publish. Beyond its ability to publish, the media has its information and
checking functions. It must gather and report information to perform these
functions. To do so it must have both the use of its tools and access to
information. Just as the media can and will be permitted to use cameras
when the public may not, the media must have access to places when the
public does not. The first amendment requires this sort of differential treat-
51. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) ("[I]f a television reporter is to convey the jail's sights and sounds to those
who cannot personally visit the place, he must use cameras and sound equipment.").
52. Consider the problem of equality of treatment articulated by Ronald
Dworkin when discussing affirmative action:
There are two different sorts of rights they may be said to have. The first
is the right to equal treatment, which is the right to an equal distribution
of some opportunity or resource or burden. Every citizen, for example, has
a right to an equal vote in a democracy; that is the nerve of the Supreme
Court's decision that one person must have one vote even if a different and
more complex arrangement would better secure the collective welfare. The
second is the right to treatment as an equal .... or benefit, but to be treated
with the same respect and concern as anyone else. If I have two children,
and one is dying from a disease that is making the other uncomfortable, I
do not show equal concern if I flip a coin to decide which should have the'
remaining dose of a drug. This example shows that the right to treatment
as an equal is fundamental, and the right to equal treatment, derivative. In
some circumstances the right to treatment as an equal will entail a right to
equal treatment, but not, by any means, in all circumstances.
R. Dwo cu, supra note 13, at 227.
53. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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ment of the media, not a formalistic equal treatment which effectively would
deny first amendment rights.
B. Different Treatment of Different Media
The Supreme Court has clearly enunciated that all media are protected
by the first amendment, but that each medium is subject to appropriate
regulation arising from its unique nature. 54 This doctrine regards each me-
dium as a unique beneficiary of the first amendment. Exactly the same
treatment of all media is not consistent with a proper understanding of
equality under the first amendment. Treatment with equal dignity is consis-
tent with the first amendment and is required.
The Court held in Kovacs v. Cooper55 that a sound truck may be reg-
ulated for sound level but may not be prohibited. Justice Jackson, concurring
in Kovacs, articulated the view that each medium should be regulated ac-
cording to its nature.56 While sound trucks expanded the ability of the dis-
advantaged to communicate,5 7 their noise level required special rules. A
regulatory scheme that did not accommodate both the need to communicate
and the tranquility of the community was not acceptable. The Court required
that such a scheme prevail.
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,58 the Court protected films by striking
down a New York blasphemy statute. The Court adopted the doctrine urged
by Justice Jackson in Kovacs:
To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guar-
anteed by the First [Amendment] ... is not the end of our problem....
[It] does [not] follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the
precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each
method tends to present its own particular problems. But the basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command,
do not vary.5 9
The Court applied this same holding in Freedman v. Maryland.60 Because of
their pictorial nature, films may be censored if protective procedures are
carefully followed. 6
Applying the scarcity rationale to the unique technology of broadcasting,
the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,6 upheld Federal Com-
54. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
55. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
56. Id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 88-89.
58. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
59. Id. at 502.
60. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
61. Id. at 58.
62. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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munications Commission rules requiring, under the fairness doctrine, a right
of reply to personal attacks:
When two people converse face to face, both should not speak at once if
either is to be clearly understood. But the range of the human voice is so
limited that there could be meaningful communications if half the people in
the United States were talking and the other half listening. Just as clearly,
half the people might publish and the other half read. But the reach of radio
signals is incomparably greater than the range of the human voice and the
problem of interference is a massive reality .... [O]ny a tiny fraction of
those with resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at
the same time if intelligent communications is to be had ....
Accordingly, the right of the general public was favored over the privileged
license.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation," the Court looked to the intrusive
nature of radio to justify regulations of offensive, but not obscene, speech.
The Court observed:
[T]he broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over
the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy
of the home, where the individual right to be left alone plainly outweighs
the First Amendment rights of an intruder. 5
On the basis of this special context the Court accepted a policy and regulation
that amount to self-censorship.
Certainly the holdings in Freedman, Red Lion, and Pacifica have not
been and would not be applied to newspapers. Indeed, Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo" specifically rejected a Red Lion-type regulation for
newspapers (without citing Red Lion).67 Yet in these cases as well as Burstyn
and Kovacs, the Court held that that medium has particular first amendment
protection. The Court did not enunciate a partial protection, but insisted
that full first amendment protection attach." That protection, however, was
structured to each unique medium. First amendment policy determines the
particular treatment of each medium. Just as different media require dis-
63. Id. at 387-88.
64. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
65. Id. at 748.
66. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
67. The Florida Supreme Court did cite Red Lion in Tornillo v. Miami Herald
Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 83-84 (Fla. 1973).
68. 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). "Nor does it follow that motion pictures are
necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of
expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command,
do not vary." Id.
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parate treatment following first amendment policy, so does the press generally
require different treatment from the public as a whole. 69
C. Choosing Among the Media
Substantial uncertainty will exist about how various segments of the
media should be treated and, at times, about who are the media and who
are not. A daily newspaper, a television station, a scholar, a pamphleteer
and a computer bulletin board operator do not need and should not receive
exactly the same treatment. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,70
where a banking corporation was forbidden by state law to publish, the
question should not have been whether the media had a special protection
vis-a-vis First National Bank of Boston.7' Rather, the issue should have been
what protection First National Bank of Boston, at least as a pamphleteer,
had as a part of the media when it communicated to the public. The same
issue would control cases like Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles,72 where an underground newspaper without police press passes was
forbidden to cross police lines at a fire, and Consumer's Union v. Periodical
Correspondents Ass'n,73 where a non-general magazine was denied access to
special facilities provided by Congress for general circulation; neither received
the treatment afforded to establishment members of the media.
In Houchins v. KQED,74 the question was not only the status of KQED,
but also of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
69. The differential treatment cases illustrate an aspect of the interpretive
effort. The people who drafted the first amendment did not know of still photog-
raphy, motion pictures, radio, television, or computers as word processors, and could
not devise a precise regime of law to govern them. If we are fortunate, they created
a system of broad principles and concepts which we can utilize as essential and
fundamental but not exclusive elements in constituting the governance of our society.
The impact of television and radio is significant. The scarcity rationale drove the
drafters of the Radio Act, however wrong they may have been. The current result
of this drive is a radio and television industry with government-granted power and
wealth. This grant may be consistent with the public interest and with the citizenry's
good. It may be this way only with government regulation, but not extensive regu-
lation. The Communication Act, and the Radio Act before it, forbade censorship,
as no doubt the Court would if the act did not.
70. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
71. Id. at 796-98 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (comparing the first amendment
rights of media and non-media corporations).
72. 9 Cal. App. 3d 448, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 982
(1971).
73. 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd as nonjusticiable, 515 F.2d 1341
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
74. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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(NAACP), a rather forgotten plaintiff in the district court.75 One could easily
view the NAACP as a part of the media, a result which should follow under
my proposed analysis. The NAACP is not only a pamphleteer and a news-
paper publisher, but also serves as a special social advocate. Thus, there is
a powerful argument that it occupies a position superior to the institutional
press. Decisions concerning equality of access must consider the different
requirements and contributions of the various members of the media and of
the public. Television journalists will require different treatment from print
journalists. At times pools representing the media must be created. The
freelance writer or scholar will require different treatment from a reporter
for a daily newspaper. These distinctions must be based on an articulated
reasonable standard.
Two federal courts have spoken on the problem of choosing which
members from among the media will be admitted. A district court would
have admitted Consumers Union to the Periodical Gallery of the House of
Representatives,76 but did not clearly establish who else might be admitted.
In another case, the Eleventh Circuit applied an equal protection analysis
and opted for a rational basis review of the defendant's conduct. 7 The court
denied a freelance journalist the same access to prisons as the establishment
media. There was no indication as to who else, if anyone, might gain access.
The two cases are broadly instructive. A strong concept of equality will
resolve nothing, and will result in a grant of access to all or none. This is
unworkable. The rational basis approach permits defendants an extremely
broad latitude of conduct which will effectively escape questioning. Although
pragmatic from the government view, this approach will result in substantial
and perhaps capricious denial of access.
The answer to this dilemma is found in administrative law. A prison
administrator, the police and fire departments, public health departments,
and even the agents of the United States House of Representatives are ad-
ministrative agencies for the purpose of deciding who shall have access to
physical places. They establish and implement policies which control access.
75. Both KQED and the NAACP alleged violations of their first amendment
rights. The NAACP claimed that access to the jails was essential in order for NAACP
members to participate knowledgeably in public debate on local jail conditions. Id.
at 4. The district court, in granting KQED access to the jail, discussed the television
station's right of access as a member of the media. Id. at 6-7. Equally interesting,
however, is the question of whether, as non-media but special advocates among the
public, the NAACP should have a superior position to the media.
76. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Assoc., 365 F. Supp. 18
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd as nonjusticiable, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1051 (1976); see also Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974)(reporter was denied access to a mayor's office).
77. Jersawitz v. Hanberry, 783 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107
S. Ct. 272 (1986).
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The policies may be in written rules, in general policy statements or in un-
written but understood agency practice. They may also be made by the
decision maker on the spot (although probably subject to his understanding
of the limits on his agency's discretion). Thus in Pell v. Procunier78 and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Publishing Co.,79 prison administrators applied
rules to control access to prisons, and in Jersawitz v. Hanberry,0 to establish
which media would have access. In Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles,"' the Los Angeles Police established media classifications for
purposes of granting access, and in Consumers Union v. Periodical Corre-
spondents Ass'n,n2 the Periodical Association, acting as a delegate of Con-
gress, made decisions concerning access among media members. The
government entity which controls the place must be given the discretion,
subject to judicial control, to limit access. 3 Such an entity will best under-
stand the problems it confronts. It must have controlled discretion to establish
practices which will enable it to fulfill its responsibilities, and which will also
respect the autonomy and concerns of those affected.
Unfortunately, the entity will be inclined to protect its self-interest and
may act without considering such factors. The agency's actions must be
guided by standards that assure full consideration of the interests of the
government entity, the media and the public. Accordingly, the government
entity making the initial decision must focus on two broad factors. First, it
must carefully evaluate the facts of the situation at hand,84 and second, it
must apply the appropriate policy consideration to the situation. 5 Thus, in
the access-to-places cases the agency must ask two general questions: Whether
granting access will unduly disrupt the governmental function of the agency
and whether the media entity under consideration can effectively commu-
nicate to the public. In addition, when there are multiple candidates for
access and not all can be accommodated, the agency must decide which is
the best suited to communicate to the public.
These seem to be extremely serious questions to commit to government
discretion. Indeed they are. Nevertheless, in reality, agencies continually make
78. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). This is what distinguished Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974) from Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), discussed infra notes
113-27 and surrounding text. In Pell discretion was properly exercised. This did not
occur in Houchins.
79. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
80. 783 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986).
81. 9 Cal App. 3d 448, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970).
82. 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd as nonjusticiable, 515 F.2d 1341
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
83. See generally Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 469 (1986).
84. Id. at 471-78 (discussing individualized decisions).
85. Id. at 483-91.
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such decisions. When the Los Angeles police, in Los Angeles Free Press,
issued press credentials only to media representatives who regularly covered
police activities,86 they made a choice of this complexity and magnitude. The
police applied a policy of permitting an appropriate group of the media to
cover its activities 7-those who regularly covered police activity-and decided
that the Free Press did not meet the criteria.8 This is an example of the
routine exercise of the substantial discretion to choose among the media.
Such discretion must be limited by the principle of equality for media access
to places. 9 The requirement that the government entity articulate reasons for
its action addresses the problem in a general way; when reasons are articu-
lated, they are better understood and the agency itself may be better able to
recognize whether it is acting in an even-handed way.
The above analysis is effectively implemented by the hard-look doc-
trine.90 Under this doctrine the judiciary assures that the agency has carefully
performed its duty by articulating a policy and applying it in a reasoned
manner to the decision at hand.9' The doctrine has four goals: (1) it requires
a reasoned explanation; (2) it requires adequate consideration; (3) it requires
consistency; and (4) it prohibits arbitrariness. 92 The model of administrative
86. Los Angeles Free Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d 448,
452, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608 (1970).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
Cm. L. REv. 20, 28 (1975).
90. See Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
91. Id. at 850-53.
92. Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Admin-
istrative Law, 7 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 51, 52 (1984); see also Greater Boston,
444 F.2d 841. In Greater Boston the court stated:
Assuming consistency with law and the legislative mandate, the agency has
latitude not merely to find facts and make judgments, but also to select the
policies deemed in the public interest. The function of the court is to assure
that the agency has given reasoned consideration to all the material facts
and issues. This calls for insistence that the agency articulate with reasonable
clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the significance of the crucial
facts, a course that tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate
general standards, applied without unreasonable discrimination....
Itssupervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in
case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legis-
lative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from
a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a
"hard look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in
reasoned decision-making. If the agency has not shirked this fundamental
task, however, the court exercises restraint and affins the agency's action
even though the court would on its own account have made different findings
or adopted different standards. Nor will the court upset a decision because
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discretion controlled by judicial review is more useful than an equal protec-
tion analysis. A careful, individualized consideration of the issues by the
initial decisionmaker is assured. A balanced result of admission of appro-
priate media entities will follow, rather than the surfeit or scarcity of media
representatives which flow from the equal protection approach. It is a vastly
superior methodology, and is the appropriate way to approach this problem.
D. Conclusion
As the Court observed in Red Lion, "The right of free speech of a
broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not
embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others." 93 Likewise, the
concept of equality of right of the public and the media under the first
amendment may not snuff out the effective exercise of the media right. A
slight preference for the media over the public is compatible with a concept
of equality of media and public under the first amendment and furthers first
amendment policy. To function effectively, the media must receive differ-
ential treatment from the public, just as sound trucks, films, radio, television
and newspapers receive differential treatment from one another.
IV. AccEss TO GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED PLACES AND PRIVATE PLACES
A. Introduction
This section considers the media's right of access to government-owned
places and to privately-owned places controlled by the government. The two
are distinct in some senses, but they share a salient characteristic. When the
media decries lack of access to either public or private places, it perceives
that something is occurring in those places that interests people. On public
property, and often when private property is subject to extensive and sub-
stantial governmental control, that interest is great and bona fide. The sit-
uation which causes the government to act, as well as the government act
itself, are likely to be of public concern. The public has a need for infor-
mation about this conduct to perform its self-governing function. In addition,
the media often has the ability to check government abuses. Governmental
activity and the public interest in that activity justify entry to public property
and to private property when it is under government control.
of errors that are not material, there being room for the doctrine of harmless
error.
Id. at 851 (footnotes omitted).
93. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969).
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Interestingly, the media has seldom litigated the question of access to
government-owned places. Aside from the accreditation and prison cases,94
the media has apparently had little problem. These important instances il-
luminate the right of access to both government owned and controlled places
and clarify any functionally different treatment the media might enjoy.
The media has had substantial difficulty with access to privately-owned
places. 9 The common law (and constitutional) basis of the property owner's
right of exclusion must be analyzed and juxtaposed against the first amend-
ment right of the media before a conclusion regarding their proper relation-
ship can be reached. I will suggest that the crucial distinction in cases involving
access to private property as opposed to government property is based upon
the right to privacy," not trespass. When government action effectively takes
control of a place and destroys privacy, the media ought to have access.
Otherwise, the media is in no better situation than the public. From these
general observations, consideration of the particular problem of access to
government owned and privately owned places must follow.
B. Access to Government-Controlled Places
To exclude any person, the government must have a good reason out-
weighing the person's reason for seeking admission." The government process
for reaching this conclusion, appropriately exercised, must be informed by
the role of the government as public servant. A democratic government has
no function other than to furthlr the welfare of its citizenry and their com-
munity.98 The decision to exclude must be reasoned, fully articulated, fairly
reached, unemcumbered by excessive process, and enforced in an evenhanded
manner. It is the courts' responsibity to assure these results.
Some general guides can be drawn from cases in which access was sought
in order to speak or to publicize an issue, rather than to gather information.
The two situations are strongly analogous. These cases recognize the gov-
ernment interest in being free of disruption in its undertakings. Courts must
consider the same factors when the media seeks access for the purpose of
gathering information. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights," the plaintiff
94. See infra notes 129-79 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 183-258 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
problem.
96. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
98. This includes furthering the welfare of all or some citizens, or of the entire
community. It does not mean simply furthering the welfare of individuals, or aggre-
gates of individuals, but it does include this. The exact means that are employed to
further the welfare of the citizens are not discussed here in any detail. The means
chosen will, of course, affect the appropriate scope of governmental action and
concern.
99. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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sought to post political advertisements on municipally owned buses. The
plurality of the Court asserted that "[b]ecause state action exists ... the
policies and practices governing access must not be arbitrary, capricious, or
invidious." 10° The Court found the advertisements could be barred from the
buses because of potential disruption. In dictum the Court suggested that
public hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military compounds and other
facilities likewise could be protected from disruption by pamphleteers. 10 Peo-
ple may generally be excluded from a government work place where the
presence of people will interfere with the functions carried on in that place.
Exclusion is otherwise improper. People may not be excluded from public
places designed for public access.' 2 More important, they may not be ex-
cluded from a work place if no interference results. The government has the
right to exclude only when necessary to its function.
In this regard, the government should have no right closely analogous
to a private right against trespass, even though the government owns property
and has the power to enforce the trespass laws.103 Its right to enforce these
laws lacks the force of the individual right of property owners to exclude
from property at will or without reason. The government has no individual
interest to be vindicated, nor does it have a privacy right closely analogous
to that of private individuals. The right of government to exclude is not an
individual right to be let alone, or to be free from unpleasant publicity. Its
only interest in exclusions is the proper function of government in its citizens'
interest.
Three leading demonstration-access cases illuminate the point. Brown v.
Louisiana'04 reversed the conviction for disturbing the peace of five black
demonstrators who had requested service in a segregated library. Thereafter,
they stood silently in the adult reading room until the sheriff, apparently not
at the library staff's request, 105 arrived and arrested them. They did not
interfere with the library's operation and no disruption occurred. The arrest
was made for refusing to leave a public building. The plurality opinion states
that the arrests occurred "solely to terminate the reasonable, orderly, and
limited exercise of the right to protest unconstitutional segregation of a public
facility." 101 The plurality then observed that the state could regulate libraries,
but not "as a pretext for pursuing those engaged in lawful, constitutionally
protected exercise of their fundamental rights.9'' 10
100. Id. at 303.
101. Id. at 304.
102. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
55 (1983) (quoted infra in text accompanying note 124).
103. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
104. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
105. Id. at 137.
106. Id. at 142.
107. Id. at 143.
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In Adderley v. Florida,08 demonstrators were arrested for trespass while
on a driveway beside a jail where other previously arrested civil rights dem-
onstrators were confined. The Adderley Court distinguished the jail grounds
from the state capitol grounds of Edwards v. South Carolina.'09 A driveway
used for jail purposes only, at a place where security was required, was the
place of demonstrations in Adderley, while the statehouse grounds were used
in Edwards."0 The Court noted that the "large crowd" in Adderley was a
problem,"' and that the demonstrations occurred "on that part of the jail
ground reserved for jail uses."" 2 In this context, the Court stated, "The
State, no less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.""'
Brown and Adderley can be reconciled on the basis of a straightforward
distinction. The Brown appellants did not interfere with the use of the library,
while the Adderley appellants threatened disruption of the jail. The Adderley
Court's emphasis on the size of the crowd, the location at a place reserved
for jail use, and the threat to the jail's use for its lawfully dedicated purpose
establishes this difference. Thus, the two cases are best understood as per-
mitting the restraint of people who threaten governmental functions, but also
as recognizing those people's right to be present at places where they do not
pose such a threat." 4
The third case, Grayned v. City of Rockford,"5 upheld the application
of an anti-noise ordinance against demonstrators arrested outside a school.
The Court clearly followed the Brown and Adderley analysis urged above.
The validity of time, place and manner regulations governing peaceful dem-
onstrations depends on the nature of the place. "One issue 'must be ad-
dressed.... The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place...."116
If the activity is not incompatible, it should be permitted. All public places
should be available for exercise of first amendment rights; any restrictions
should be based not on common law tradition, but rather on the nature and
function of the public place." 7
108. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
109. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
110. Id.
111. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAuv. L. REv. 110, 138-
41 (1967). The Note suggests the function analysis as asecond, less likely, alternative
to total exclusion from sensitive places. Id. at 139-40; see also Note, The Public
Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV.
117 (1975) (arguing for a minimum access approach).
115. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
116. Id. at 115-16.




Brown, Adderley and Grayned also illuminate the problem of the ex-
ercise of discretion. In Brown, the action of the sheriff-without request by
the library staff-was clearly discriminatory."' In Adderley, the size of the
crowd and its location convinced the Court that no discrimination had oc-
cured. In Grayned, the Court observed that the statute, in context, guided
police discretion.11 9 Given the lack of disruption in Brown and the perceived
danger in Adderley, the Court properly reacted to the exercise of discretion
in each case. The Court has, since Grayned, inclined towards an approach
drawn from Adderley. Property is categorized as dedicated to; (1) public use,
(2) limited access for speech, or (3) particular matters for a government
function without public access.' 20 The cases, however, have not repudiated
the analysis of the earlier cases urged by this Article,1 2' and have purported
to follow it. 22 Indeed, in the important Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educator's Association'23 decision, in an assertion of law essential to
the result, the Court stated, "When speakers and subjects are similar situated,
the State may not pick and choose. Conversely, on government property that
has not been made a public forum, not all speakers are equally situated and
the State may draw distinctions which relate to the special purposes for which
the property is used." 124 Thus the government and first amendment purpose
must be considered at least to some degree. The recent decisions have been
criticized within the Court'21 and by the commentators' 26 as categorizing which
avoids careful consideration of first amendment and other interests. While
the analysis in some opinions may have been superficial, the Court never-
118. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966). Justice White concurred
in the result and wrote separately to emphasize this point. In Adderley, Justice White,
without opinion, joined the majority of five in the absence of a showing of unequal
treatment. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966).
119. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114.
120. See Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum Problems in First A mend-
ment Analysis, 55 Gno. WAsH. L. R.v. 109 (1987).
121. Id.
122. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640 (1981), the court held that regulations on distribution .of religious literature at
the Minnesota State Fair could be restricted to a booth because of a concern with
congestion of walkways at the fair. Whatever doubts exist about the result in Heffron(mine are substantial) - a proper doctrinal approach was utilized. In United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 471 (1965), where limits on leafleting on sidewalks outside the
Supreme Court were overturned, assertedly to protect the sidewalks from congestion,
a similar approach was followed.
123. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). The Perry Court explained at length that only access
for the bargaining agent of the school employees and not a rival employee organi-
zation is required. This analysis is necessary under the textual quote from Perry and
this Article's thesis.
124. Id. at 55.
125. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985).
126. Dienes, supra note 120.
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theless asserts it is using this approach. The Court's hesitance to embrace an
analytical approach has not resulted in a rejection of Grayned, Brown and
Adderley, but rather a shortcut to a result. The promise of careful analysis
of competitive values of these cases should be fulfilled.
Under the reasoning of these cases the media ought to be readily granted
access to government work places. This is because the media and the public
may be excluded from such places only if their presence would interfere with
the governmental functions to which those work places are dedicated.' 27
The presence of media observers in the government work place will likely
be less disruptive than demonstrations or even demonstrators. The media
may receive preferred access over the public since a small number of persons
is less disruptive than a large group. As a practical matter, problems seldom
arise. Not many members of the public desire access to most facilities, and
popular facilities are likely to arrange for public tours. Nevertheless, I do
not doubt the propriety of excluding people from, for example, the Govern-
ment Printing Office or the Library of Congress if one of them suddenly
becomes a focus of great attention and mass congestion threatened to inter-
fere with its function.
Total exclusion, however, would rarely be appropriate. Rather, rules
such as those implemented in Pell v. Procunier are required. 2 The rules
127. Blasi, supra note 27, at 609-10. Consider Professor Blasi's discussion of
the failure of government to permit access to sources under the government's control:
[S]ince under the checking value the dissemination of information about the
behavior of government officials is the paradigm First Amendment activity,
policies and practices that reduce the amount and quality of information
disseminated to the public should not be upheld simply because they serve
the convenience, or embody traditional prerogatives, of the government. At
a minimum, restrictions on press coverage of official activities should be
upheld only if it can be shown that the restrictions substantially promote
an important government objective that cannot be promoted sufficiently by
alternative policies having a less restrictive impact on what interested out-
siders can learn about official conduct. For example, under this standard
all journalists could not be excluded from a police inspection of the scene
of a recent crime if a single pool reporter and/or photographer could be
admitted without disrupting the investigation.
Second, under the checking value, the interest of the press (and ulti-
mately the public) in learning certain information relevant to the abuse of
official power would sometimes take precedence over perfectly legitimate
and substantial government interests such as efficiency and confidentiality....
In short, a proponent of the checking value should treat requests by jour-
nalists to view government activities and inspect official records as embod-
ying First Amendment interests of the highest order.
Id.
128. The regulation in Pell, section 415.071 of the California Department of
Corrections Manual, prohibited media interviews with inmates specifically chosen by
the media. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 819 (1974). The prison did have a policy
of conducting public tours through the prison in which both the press and the public
might participate. Id. at 830.
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should set forth standards for controlling access rights. For the public at
large, access might be limited even though access would be granted to the
media. The controlling factor in determining a different treatment of media
and public should be the degree of access appropriate for the media to fulfill
its function. In some situations, press galleries or press rooms will be re-
quired. Indeed, legislative bodies often accommodate the media in special
galleries; the courts accommodate the media in special sections, and executive
and administrative offices often have press rooms or offices. The public is
relegated to tours and limited visits. Constitutional policy arguments favor
this preference for the media. The media needs better access and facilities if
it is to perform its reporting job properly. Policy arguments support a weak
constitutional preference for access to government facilities for the media
under the press clause.
1. The Prison Access Cases
This section considers the prison access cases. How these cases are an-
alyzed determines to a substantial degree how journalists will be treated in
other situations. Given that the media and the public have the same first
amendment right, the issue is whether the media is to be treated precisely
the same as the public. If so, the issue is largely closed. If, for any reason,
the press is to be accorded the same general rights accommodated in a some-
what different way, the issue is substantial.
Pell v. Procunier29 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.130 held that,
beyond that granted by prison regulation, journalists have no greater right
to access than the public. In fact, prison rules in those cases granted to the
media somewhat greater access than the media needed to perform its func-
tion. Although Houchins v. KQED, Inc.31 reached much the same result,
the fractured Court13 2 produced no majority opinion and the minority opi-
nions are inadequate. 33 In addition, none of the opinions supporting equal
treatment which result in exclusion adequately distinguished the drastic dif-
ference between the facts in Pell and those in Houchins. Properly understood,
the cases establish a basis for appropriate differential treatment of the public
and the media under the first amendment.
129. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
130. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
131. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
132. The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White
and Rehnquist. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens dissented
and was joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, while Justices Marshall and Blackmun
took no part in the decision of the case. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 2 (1978).
133. The opinion in Houchins failed to note that a jail is used to house pre-
sumably innocent individuals prior to their trials. The court also failed to justify the
total lack of access for the press to the facility until after the suit was filed, at which
time limited access became available. Id. at 4.
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In Pell, visitation of prisoners was permitted on a regular basis,13 4 and
the media, like the public, could sit in on prison programs.1 35 In addition,
the media was permitted to interview randomly selected prisoners. 36 But the
media complained of restraints on interviewing particular inmates. 37 The
prison authorities articulated a justification for this restraint: the media se-
lection of prisoners for interviews created celebrity prisoners. 38 Such prison-
ers were accorded special status by their fellows, which created problems of
prison management, 39 debilitating the prison's function. These rules had been
properly adopted by the California Department of Corrections.' 4° The limi-
tations on the media were supported by a reasoned analysis which rationally
led to the particular limitations imposed on the media.' 41
The result in Pell is consistent with a theory that while the public and
the media share the same general first amendment rights, their precise treat-
ment need not be the same. Pell permitted accommodation of special media
needs. The Court may speak of the public and the media enjoying the same
first amendment rights, but nevertheless, in Pell the Court emphatically and
clearly accepted a situation where the media were permitted the greater access
necessary to perform their function while being denied access which would
hamper the function of the prison. This result is fully consistent with general
equality among the media and between the media and public. Properly un-
derstood, the Pell holding supports a constitutional policy providing the
media a functional preference within equal treatment of media and public.
The Houchins facts render media exclusion problematic. No regular
general access was accorded to either the public or the media at the time the
suit was filed. 42 Tours were conducted monthly on a first come, first served
basis. 143 These tours, however, did not include the Greystone section, where
torture, gang rape and attendant suicide allegedly had occurred. 144 Contact
with inmates was not permitted during the tours, 45 nor was any special
contact for the media (such as the random selection method of Pell) permitted
at any other time.'" Rules promulgated later did not hold their own justi-
fication, nor was any justification offered. 47
134. 417 U.S. 817, 821 (1974). The visitation rights in Saxbe were substantially
similar. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846.
135. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 831.
138. Id. at 832.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 819.
141. Id. at 831.
142. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 4 (1978).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 3.
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This broad exclusion of the public and the media was accepted by the
Court. Support for this conclusion is weak. The plurality urged that a pot-
pourri of governmental and quasi-governmental oversight informed the pub-
lic and provided adequate148 information to the public and the media. 149 Thus,
the government watched itself. This is a dubious proposition at best, and is
the antithesis of our democratic theory. An informed public exercising its
right to evaluate and to check its government must have access to the places
where necessary information can be acquired. A contrary practice is especially
unjustified when a grossly disadvantaged class,'50 such as prisoners, is in-
volved. Here, the tendency of people to inflict harn and indignity under the
cloak of government authority' 5' is especially pronounced. A checking func-
tion is particularly needed under these circumstances. Further, the public
requires knowledge of prisons and jails if it is to properly discharge its
governing function. KQED, a television station, cannot inform the public
unless it can function as a television station. To do so KQED must have the
use of its camera. 15 2 Television, like any medium, becomes less than its full
self when denied the use of its technology. It can report facts about jails,
but it cannot convey as complete an understanding of them as would be
possible with pictures. Although cognitive material in the form of compiled
intellectual data must be transmitted, a fuller appreciation of a situation may
be conveyed by the psychological and emotional content of pictures and
sounds. These, like rhetoric, can arouse citizens to the action required in
self-government and in check-government.
Justice Stewart, concurring, urged that this particular need of KQED
must be met. 153 The sheriff had an obligation under the first amendment to
148. Id. at 12-13.
149. Id. at 13.
150. See M. PERRY, supra note 39, at 148-54.
151. Blasi, supra note 27, at 541.
152. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
153. Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring). The need is evident. For television,
access to places must be be allowed with their (appropriate) equipment. Without it
they may not cease to be journalists, but they cease to be effective electronic jour-
nalists. Information conveyed by print or an announcer on television serves a vital
purpose. Understanding degradation and violence is more than intellectual data. The
psychological force of those circumstances when seen substantially transcends pos-
sessing information. That measure of psychological force is required for full and
effective comprehension.
Consider Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). A tee-shirt printed "I DE-
TEST THE DRAFT" does not communicate as well, even in a jaded 1987, as one
printed "Fuck the Draft." The Court said:
[W]e cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode
involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are
often chosen as much for their emotion as their cognitive force. We cannot
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accommodate the television station by permitting it to use a camera. Anything
less would fall short of first amendment requirements. Television stations
are simply different from the print media or the public. They present different
circumstances that require different responses. Not only must the media be
treated differently from the public, but each medium must also be treated
differently and appropriately under the first amendment.
Rather than decide what particular treatment is required (or desirable),
the Houchins decision rejects a broad demand of access. KQED sought a
"special right of access"'5 4 as a media entity, and petitioned for injunctive
relief forbidding the Alameda County government from "excluding KQED
news personnel from the Greystone cells and Santa Rita facilities and gen-
erally preventing full and accurate news coverage of the conditions prevailing
sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of
the overall message sought to be communicated.
Id. at 25-26.
Television employs emotion better than do tee-shirts, and to deny that power
to television would render it a second-class first amendment actor. More than "pre-
cise, detracted explication" is required to understand our world, or check our gov-
ernment. Here, I would go beyond the "intermediate weight" Professor Blasi would
accord vivid transmission of information.
A third general observation concerns the distinction between press claims of
access to official information that otherwise would be confidential and claims
relating to more vivid coverage - televising, tape recording, photographing
- of events that are already open to descriptive reporting. Although vivid
transmission can serve the checking value by capturing the attention of a
public that might not respond to mere descriptions of abuse, the key stage
of the checking process is the initial acquisition of information. When jour-
nalists actually secure evidence of serious official wrongdoing, they seldom
lack for ways to dramatize what they have learned. Also, the checking
process does not always depend on widespread public outrage, even though
popular indignation can sometimes help to bolster the resolve of specialized
actors in the checking process, such as prosecutors, judges, grand jurors,
and legislative investigators. Thus, a proponent of the checking value should
accord greater weight in First Amendment analysis to claims relating to initial
access to otherwise unavailable information than to claims relating to the
more vivid transmission of information. He should, nevertheless, accord at
least intermediate weight to claims of the latter sort.
Blasi, supra note 27, at 610. The teaching of Cohen supports this, as did the con-
temporary electronic reporting of the Vietnam War. The vividness of that war depicted
its horror in ways that print accounts from the Sommee or Verdun, with their greater
slaughter, or the battlefields of World War II or Korea, did not. If in doubt, reflect
on MASH from television or Platoon from the cinema, where differing media with
differing methods of presentation utilize the visual electronic media to portray war
in a way words cannot. These presentations may carry no more truth, but they seem,
to me, more effective in causing actual checks on government action to occur.
154. Id. at 7.
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therein."' 155 This special-access argument fails, in part, because it is excessive.
The appropriate extent of access is not established by the demands or whims 15 6
of the media. Rather, sufficient access to meet the media's needs should be
sought. In Pell, the media could perform its information-transmitting and
checking functions without interviews, particularly interviews of celebrity
prisoners. Access can occur upon a demand only when countervailing reasons
of substance do not exist.
Consider the information that was to be transmitted in Houchins. Be-
yond recognizing the public's legitimate concern with prison conditions, 5 7
the Court says little about the larger societal concern with prison conditions.
Still, Houchins itself highlights the broader societal problem. The alleged
conditions which permitted torture and gang rape'58 are illustrative of the
often deplorable conditions in the United States's prisons. That the penal
system stands as part of the criminal justice system' 9 is a salient factor in
the analysis of problems involving access to prisons and prisoners.'6' At
present, only the trial is consitutionally required to be open to the public.'1
6
The need for secrecy in investigation 162 and in extrajudicial parts of pretrial
activity is obvious. 63 The state and, to a lesser degree, the defendant have
155. Id. at 4.
156. Lest the language seem excessive, remember that the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977), does not require any justification for access to
information, and has been construed to permit access at whim.
157. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 8, 16 (1978). The respondent's ar-
gument that the public importance of conditions in penal facilities justified the media's
role of providing information was rejected by the plurality opinion. Id. at 16.
158. Id. at 5. See M. PERRY, supra note 39, at 148-54.
159. The criminal justice system operates from the commission of a crime to
the end of a prison sentence, including periods of probation and parole. Indeed, it
ought to operate before a crime is committed by deterring the crime, or perhaps
ameliorating the social and individual psychological conditions leading to criminal
conduct. It ought also to operate after a prison sentence by reforming the criminal,
or by a combination of reform and deterrence acting on a prisoner to prevent further
crime. All these matters are of paramount public importance. One cannot assert that
the criminal justice system is the most important issue facing our policy, but it is
certainly among the most important.
160. See M. PERRY, supra note 39, at 147-62.
161. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980); see
also Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (permitting the closure of pre-
trial proceedings).
162. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564.
163. This need for secrecy is best shown in grand jury investigations where
secrecy is kept unless the defendant can show a "particularized need" for the infor-
mation. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959). Were
this not kept secret, a person under investigation would be able to flee. Disclosure
of an investigation could also cause a great deal of harm to a person under inves-
tigation even if he or she was subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing. The same is
true of the decisions and supervision of probation and parole. Since an adverse
decision may greatly harm the convicted, the justification is unclear.
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sufficient reasons to avoid publicity regarding what occurs before trial. Under
Gannett v. DePasquale,16 the defendant can demand an open pretrial hear-
ing, and in some other cases pretrial hearings must be open. 165 Under Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,'6 the trial itself must be open.
Prisons are closed, leaving prisoners isolated. Although this is certainly
not "good" or "desirable," it may be "expedient."' ' 67 It is paradoxical that
closure of prisons is constitutionally permissible, apparently under any cir-
cumstance,' 68 while closure of trials is constitutionally forbidden:
It is somewhat ironic that the court should find more reason to recognize
a right to access [to trials] than it did [to prisons] in Houchins. For Houchins
involved the plight of a segment of society least able to protect itself, an
attack on a longstanding policy of concealment, and an absence of any
legitimate justification for information about how government operates. In
this case we are protecting the interests of the most powerful voices in the
community, we are concerned with an almost unique exception to an estab-
lished tradition of openness in the conduct of criminal trials, and it is likely
that the closure order was motivated by the judge's desire to protect the
individual defendant from the burden of a fourth criminal trial. 69
Jail and prison visitation is a paradigm area for the operation of the con-
stitutional policy favoring a limited preference for the media. It is simply
impractical for members of the public at large to discharge their obligations
as citizens by actually visiting the institution. The media, on the other hand,
cannot discharge its function as media without making such visits. The press
clause confers the needed advantage on the media. While the plurality con-
clusion of Houchins should thus be rejected, Pell should be construed to
form the basis of a first amendment doctrine and jurisprudence which re-
quired a slight, functional preference of access for the media.
2. The Military Base Cases
Although the military base cases deal with access to military bases for
purposes of political campaigning rather than for gathering information, the
164. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). In Gannett it was the
defendant who moved to close the pretrial hearing to the press and public. The
prosecution did not object and the judge closed the hearing. Id. at 375. "Publicity
concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hearing, however, could influence public
opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory material wholly
inadmissible at the actual trial." Id. at 378.
165. Press Enters. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986). The decision is
limited to the special California procedure. Id. at 2741. The trend, however, seems
to be to open most or all hearings.
166. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
167. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 8, 13 (1978).
168. Id.
169. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583-84 (1980) (Stev-
ens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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Court's reasoning in the cases is nevertheless helpful. In Flower v. United
States,170 the Court reversed the lower court's conviction of Flower for tres-
pass while distributing pamphlets on New Braunfeld Avenue, Fort Sam Hous-
ton. The highway was open to all traffic twenty-four hours a day, with a
vehicle count of over 15,000, including buses and other public transportation.
There was similar civilian pedestrian traffic.1 7' Flower had been previously
excluded from the base. The reversal came despite a specific statute imposing
criminal sanctions on anyone who re-entered a military base after being
excluded.' 2z The Court, quoting the dissent below, concluded, "Fort Sam
Houston was an open post; the street ... was a completely open street."'
73
A policy of exclusion from such streets cannot be supported.
In Greer v. Spock,174 the Court reversed an injunction ordering the
commander of Fort Dix to permit access and made it clear that Fort Dix
could be closed to candidates for office. 75 The second sentence of the opinion
conveys the crux of the factual difference between Greer and Flower. "[Fort
Dix's] primary mission is to provide basic combat training for newly inducted
army personnel."' 76 The Court also observed that Fort Dix is in a rural area
and that local government roads and walkways passing through it are under
military police jurisdiction, that the roads and walkways are posted to this
effect, and the military policy routinely exercise their power.'" The Court
further emphasized a Fort Dix regulation forbidding political campaigning
on the base, 78 and General Greer's letter restating its existence and ration-
ale. 79 The Court then found that the policy had been evenly applied." 0
The opinion also considers the larger functional problem of separating
the military from the political process in a democracy. The United States
political system seeks to further this separation."' Justice Powell, concurring,
expounded the concept:
The public interest in preserving the separation of the military from a par-
tisan politics places campaign activities on bases in a unique position. Unlike
the normal civilian pedestrian and vehicular traffic that is permitted freely
in Fort Dix, person-to-person campaigning may seriously infringe upon the
separate and neutral status of the Armed Services in our society. At the
170. 407 U.S. 197 (1971) (per curiam).
171. Id. at 198.
172. Id. at 197.
173. Id. at 198.
174. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
175. Id. at 838.
176. Id. at 830.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 831.
179. Id. at 833.
180. Id. at 839.
181. Id.
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same time, the infringement on the individual First Amendment rights of
the candidates and the servicemen is limited narrowly to the protection of
the particular Government interest involved. Political communications reach
military personnel on bases in every form except when delivered in person
by the candidate or his supporters and agents .... [S]ervicemen are not
isolated from the information they need to exercise their responsibilities as
citizens and voters. Our national policy has been to preserve a distinction
between the role of the soldier and that of the citizen."8
The Court's differing results in Flower and Greer are based on a rationale
closely analogous to this Article's distinction of Pell and Houchins. In Pell,
as in Greer, the restrictions were contained in published documents. The
documents in both Pell and Greer spoke reasonably to the rationale for
restrictions and gave particular reasons. The restrictions were the least in-
trusive consistent with that reasoned approach and they were evenhandedly
enforced. In Flower, as in Houchins, little reason was given for the govern-
ment action. The Flower regulation was all-inclusive and provided no reason
for its scope or particular application. Further, there was no reason for the
exclusion in Flower or Houchins save an arbitrary government decision or a
desire to keep matters secret (for no articulated reason or for bad reasons).
Nevertheless, further consideration of the analysis of Pell and Houchins
and its application is warranted. In Greer-type situations, the media ought
to have the right to the same sort of access as in Pell. As in Pell, however,
the right of the media need not be substantially greater than that of the
public. Public tours of training facilities should be permitted if they would
not be dangerous. Priority of access, when safety dictates restrictions, should
go to the media. The exclusion of the media from military bases is untenable.
Opportunities for random interviews of military personnel by the media should
be allowed. Such activities would not disrupt the training process generally.
In some situations, however, the safety of both the press and military per-
sonnel may require restrictions. When weapons are fired or gas is released,
both the military personnel and journalists might be endangered. Restraints
for dangerous situations can easily be set forth in self-explaining and self-
justifying regulations. The media preference should be, as in Pell, real but
minimal. Accordingly, the media ought to have access to public places unless
such access seriously disrupts the functioning of the place, or unless safety
would be compromised.
3. The Press Now Requires Preferential Treatment
The above analysis of Lehman, Flower, Greer, Pell and Houchins dem-
onstrates that enforceable, viable rules concerning access can be established
for general types of areas. The rules can~be adopted and published in a way
182. Id. at 847 (Powell, J., concurring).
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that is not cumbersome. The reasonableness of such rules can be considered
and reviewed in a way that does not unduly burden the government and does
not violate the rights of the public or the press. The capacity to accomplish
this task supports the constitutional policy favoring a weak preference for
the media under the press clause. Likewise, it demonstrates that this policy
should favor media access to government owned and controlled places unless
countervailing considerations trump this right.
The press and public have the same constitutional right under the first
amendment, but as a matter of first amendment policy these rights should
be realized in a somewhat different manner. The public should not be entitled
to assert a right to attend a press conference, receive press credentials, visit
the scene of a fire, or conduct a random interview of prisoners as permitted
by Pell or Saxbe. The different treatment flows from the same sort of con-
siderations that underpin the Supreme Court's different treatment of the
various media under the first amendment. This is because the public en masse
can not participate in press conferences, receive press credentials, attend fires
or interview randomly selected prisoners for the purpose of informing itself.
Accordingly, the public is excluded. The media, on the other hand, can be
present in sufficient numbers to fulfill its reporting role and to perform its
information-conveying function. Equality does not require the same treat-
ment of the media and the public, but rather requires full respect for the
first amendment rights of each. Properly understood, constitutional policy
supports, and indeed compels, granting the media a functional preference of
access to places.
C. Media Access to Private Places
A functional preference for the media within the first amendment prin-
ciple should, in some circumstances, protect the media not only when it seeks
access to public places but when it seeks access to privately-owned places as
well. However, the policy arguments favoring such access are often less
forceful and support a more limited right of access. The private party has a
countervailing interest (I identify it as a privacy interest) that may be more
important than the media right. In addition, the information sought may be
trivial compared to knowledge about such things as prisons, military bases,
and other governmental functions. Further, the information sought may be
readily available from other sources. The importance of particular infor-
mation and its availability from other sources, however, ought to be em-
phatically committed to journalistic discretion.13 What is crucial is the degree
of governmental control over private property.
183. See Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977). The vesting of editorial discretion in editors is funda-
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The media has raised a first amendment defense to criminal prosecution
and tort claims arising from the media's entry to private property while
pursuing news, just as it has with entry to government facilities. Several
courts have rendered decisions involving the right of the media to access to
private places under these circumstances. 184 These cases rely on theories of
trespass, privacy or other grounds. The first amendment claim is generally
rejected and the bulk of the cases have been decided against the journalists.
The decisions as a whole lack coherence. Under the proposed analysis, the
media should prevail more often than it has. The analysis illustrates the need
for a slight functional preference for the media under the first amendment.
The journalist's mode of obtaining access to private property and its
effect on the plaintiff should be given substantial importance in the rights
of the media. If the media obtains access by intrusion-by guile or merely
without consent-and destroys the plaintiff's privacy while trespassing, the
plaintiff is wronged. The media action causes harm both by the improperly
obtained access and the subsequent publicity. The plaintiff should be pro-
tected. If the journalist obtains access properly, no wrong flows from the
journalist's conduct. In such situations the journalist does not destroy privacy
or harm property. Here entry may be attained by consent of the party owning
or controlling the property, or by force of law implying consent. The most
important implied consent cases are those in which the government controls
the property or the property-owner is compelled to grant access. This situ-
ation prevails, for instance, at the scene of a crime or a fire. The place
becomes a government-controlled place and should be treated in essence as
a government facility. 85
mental to the first amendment.
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment,
and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to ... content ... and treatment of public issues and
public officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First
Amendment guarantees of a free press....
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). Earlier in the
opinion, the Court equated printing a reply with prior governmental restraint. Id. at
256. The Court is correct. Editorial discretion to say what one wants is part of the
core principle enumerated earlier in this Article and must be fully accommodated.
See supra note 22.
184. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Le
Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978); Prahl v. Brosamle,
98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1980); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986
(2d Cir. 1973).
185. For a somewhat different approach, see Note, Press Passes and Tres-
passes: Newsgathering on Private Property, 84 CoLum. L. REv. 1298 (1984), which
argues that "the relationship of press access to the democratic process" should control
media rights. Id. at 1326. This extends to both a checking of government action, and
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The essential question when the media seeks access to a private place is
whether the place in some sense has become public. This occurs most often
when government agents-police, fire, health, safety-take temporary control
of the premises to discharge their duties. '86 This control converts the property,
in a significant sense, into a governmental domain. The government uses the
property more or less as it wishes because its police or fire agents must fully
control the premises to perform their functions.
At this juncture the nature of interests changes. No longer is there merely
a conflict centered on a private media interest and a private property or
privacy interest. Rather there are three interests-the private or privacy in-
terest, the public interest in knowing what the government is doing, and the
private media interest. The public interest includes protecting the private
party's interests in autonomy from government action both by receiving
information for self-governance and via the checking function.'"
1. The Private Interests
a. The Trespass Theory
Limits on access that are based on a trespass theory which protects
property owners must be considered. The usefulness of this theory waxes and
wanes and, in a sense, is not too important. Regardless of whether the
journalist is treated as a trespasser, the crux of the problem is disclosure of
information. The journalist lacks justification for the disclosure unless the
plaintiff's consent to the journalist's presence negates the objection to dis-
closure.188 The journalist may obtain this consent by virtue of acts of the
plaintiff, operation of law, or government agents' taking control of the
observation of private conduct. Id. at 1326-28. This Article rejects this balancing-of-
interests approach, and prefers the government-control approach. The government-
control approach focuses on the function of checking government conduct. An im-
portant attribute of this approach is a greater protection of private interests and a
clear emphasis on media-government relationships.
186. The less immediate the threat of abuse of government power, the less
compelling is the media case. The police use force, and fire departments deal with
immediate life-threatening situations and require coverage. Health and safety inspec-
tions are less immediately abusive. Often any harm they inflict will be subject to
remedy by the victim's checking the media.
Of course, the proper conduct in another sense is important. They must properly
perform their job. This, however, is a self-governance concern more than a checking
function concern.
187. For purposes of first amendment analysis in this instance, the public and
media interest can be threatened, for the most part, together.
188. See King & Muto, Compensatory Damages for Newsgathering Torts: To-
wards a Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 919 (1981).
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premises. In such instances, the media does not trespass and there occurs no
intrusion into truly private affairs. Trespass here serves as a delineation of
privacy, not as the core value at issue.
Since trespass requires absence of consent, the trespass cases present an
intriguing problem of determining when consent occurs. In Belluomo v. KAKE
TV and Radio, Inc., 19 one of the plaintiff partners had granted the defendant
television station permission to film in the plaintiffs' restaurant. Another
partner revoked permission after the filming.190 The plaintiffs additionally
asserted fraud in obtaining consent.1 91 The defendant had told the consenting
partner that the filming would provide part of a series on restaurants. 192 In
fact, the filming was used as part of a program which was critical of the
cleanliness and sanitary standards of the restaurant, 93 and which neglected
the restaurant's favorable characteristics.194 The court found for the plaintiffs
on both the ground of fraudulently obtained consent and on the revocation
of consent. The absence of consent rendered the defendant a trespasser.
The facts of Belluomo parallel those of Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,195
involving fraudulent entry. The plaintiff in Dietmann was an allegedly bogus
medical practitioner. Journalists posing as patients achieved entry into the
office in his home'96 where they photographed and sound recorded plaintiff's
activities with hidden cameras and electronic gear. 97 The plaintiff first learned
of the journalistic enterprise when his picture and quotations appeared in a
story in Life magazine. 98 A generalized invasion of privacy right based on
the fraudulently induced entry was found to have occurred. 99 Belluomo could
also have been decided on invasion of privacy grounds. The defendant re-
porters and camera crew entered parts of the plaintiffs' restaurant which
were not open to the public," thus both intruding on and subsequently
revealing unpleasant facts about the plaintiff. The two cases, which have as
their essence the right to be left in repose and freedom from consequent
publicity, ought to have been treated as privacy cases. The absence of consent
creates both the tort of trespass and the consequent harm of invasion of
privacy. 20'
189. 3 Kan. App. 2d 461, 596 P.2d 832 (1979).
190. Id. at - , 596 P.2d at 836.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at - . 596 P.2d at 837-38.
194. Id. at - , 596 P.2d at 840.
195. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
196. Id. at 246.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 247.
199. Id. at 249.
200. 3 Kan. App. 2d 461, - , 596 P.2d 832, 840 (1979).
201. See King & Muto, supra note 188.
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The consent issue in other trespass cases turns upon the right to enter
under local custom.un Formal consent is not required but is implied on the
basis of common practice. For example, where it is customary to hunt on
land which is not posted, hunters do no trespass.203 Likewise the door-to-
door salesperson who makes her call without an appointment commits no
trespass.24
Journalists are expected routinely to cover police and fire activity, just
as hunters are expected to roam unposted land in hunting season, or vendors
to approach doors. When police or fire department personnel or similar
government agents enter property, journalists follow as a part of their job.
Certainly the interest of journalists in gathering news is as important today
as the interests of hunters or salespersons. That historic interest is reinforced
by the weight of the first amendment. A court cannot be seriously faulted
for finding that it is customary for journalists to accompany government
agents. Indeed, if any customary right to enter is to be recognized, it should
be recornized under these circumstances because the privacy interests have
been diminished by the action of government agents. Not only does no harm
result from the accompanying journalist, but no trespass occurs.
b. The Privacy Analysis
The infringed interest of the non-journalist plaintiff is nearly always
primarily a privacy interest even when the courts articulate other theories.
While a trespass often occurs and may be important, the plaintiff usually is
concerned about disclosure or publication of information subsequent to the
trespass, rather than the trespass per se. The privacy rationale of protecting
the property owner remains when the trespass rationale is diminished. Con-
202. See, e.g., Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 150, 295 N.W.2d 768, 779
(Ct. App. 1980); Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 917, cert. denied,
431 U.S. 930 (1977).
203. The court in McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922) stated:
The strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close must
be taken to be mitigated by common understanding with regard to the large
expanses of unenclosed and uncultivated land in many parts at least of this
country. Over there it is customary to wander, shoot and fish at will until
the owner sees fit to prohibit it. A license may be implied from the habits
of the country.
Id. at 136.
204. The Restatement Second of Torts section 892 comment d speaks to implied
consent from community customs. If salesmen customarily had access to homes, there
is an implied consent to this. Localities can also pass ordinances forbidding this
activity. See, e.g., Beard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 66, reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 843
(1951); Real Silk Hoisery Mills v. City of Richmond, 298 F. 126 (9th Cir. 1924).
Of course, in a case like Le Mistral v. CBS, 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815
(1978) (facts in text at note 205 infra), the plaintiff objected to both intrusion into
the restaurant and publicity.
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sider the effect of hunters and vendors on a landowner's privacy. They do
intrude. They awaken the unwary sleeper who has not posted his land. They
disturb the physical tranquility of a place. They do not, however, invade the
deeper psychic tranquility of a person by gross physical intrusion or by
exposure of private facts. These constitute injury to a privacy interest, not
to a property interest.
The privacy doctrine in these cases has not been eloquently developed
by the courts, nor is it likely to be with a pure tort analysis. An aspect of
intrusion is certainly important in some cases, but protection from intrusion
usually is not the ultimate value protected. Thus, in Le Mistral v. Columbia
Broadcasting Company,25 when television cameramen entered the plaintiff's
restaurant with cameras operating, the disruption caused by the cameras' use
may have been a sufficiently intense intrusion to harm the plaintiff, but the
subsequent publicity about sanitary conditions probably concerned the plain-
tiff more. Likewise, in Prahl v. Brosamle,206 a case decided on a trespass
theory, where a journalist accompanied a sheriff on a justified night raid of
the plaintiff's home and office, the intrusive effect of the journalist's presence
may have been harmful but it was only the beginning of the harm. The
subsequent publicity was what really hurt. In cases like Dietemann v. Time,
Inc. ,27 the media's presence is not disturbing because the journalist's mis-
representation keeps the reason for the media's presence from the plaintiff.
Were the identity of the journalist and the motives known, discomfort would
no doubt arise. In these cases, subsequent publicity is the more important
concern of the plaintiffs. The Le Mistral plaintiff did not wish films of the
premises used in a story linking the establishment to a failed sanitary in-
spection. 2°3 The Prahl plaintiff asserted harm from publication of a story
based on inaccurate police accounts the journalists were given at the time of
the raid.2 The Dietemann plaintiff did not wish the dubious nature of his
medical enterprise publicized. The plaintiff in each case knew harm occurred
only with publication. The public disclosure of private facts imposes harm,
not the trespass. 210
205. 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978).
206. 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1980).
207. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
208. 61 A.D.2d 491, -, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1978).
209. 98 Wis. 2d 130, 139-46, 295 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Ct. App. 1980).
210. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). Only in a case like Galella,
is the intrusion the essential element. In Galella, the defendant, a self-styled papa-
razzo, intruded on Ms. Jacqueline Onassis and her children by constantly photo-
graphing them at close range. Id. at 991. The matter was aggravated by the defendant's
sometimes sudden appearance, occasionally creating dangerous situations, and his
disruption of the children's school life. Id. at 991-92. For the widow and children of
President John F. Kennedy, and the wife of a well known shipping figure, publicity
was commonplace. This publicity included the sort of candid photographs the de-
fendant sought. Id. In this case, however, the method of acquiring the photographs
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2. Interests Supporting Media Access to Private Property
a. Functions of the Media
The function of the media is not limited to reporting the plaintiff's
conduct and travail. It includes observing and reporting the conduct of the
police and fire personnel. Indeed, it is the performance of the public agent's
duty, not the plaintiff's misfortune, which ought to be the primary public
concern. In this aspect the media exercises its checking function. 21' The public
is informed of the action and conduct of its agents. The light of disclosure
helps check abuse in that conduct. In addition, reporting provides infor-
mation useful for self-government. Public receipt of this information is of
great importance and the public interest is thus vindicated by the media's
presence212 which results in transmission of this information.
The media interest in obtaining access should be vindicated only if it
furthers these first amendment interests. The media concern with profits or
prestige does not successfully countervail against the interests of the property
owner. The media must have an interest in gathering information of impor-
tance to the public. This often will be the circumstance when the government
controls the property, less so when it does not. Indeed, to a substantial degree
the taking of control by government power, buttressed by possible recourse
to the violence lawfully available only to the government, is the act to be
observed, not the private plaintiff's conduct. From such observation comes
an ability to evaluate performance of the government's job and check its
abuses in that performance.
If the property owner is engaged in anti-social behavior or other mis-
conduct, the public has an interest in being made aware of it. In case of
serious misconduct such as major criminal activity, the importance is en-
hanced. Often, however, the interest is trivial. A dirty restaurant, 23 a fraud-
ulent medical practitioner, 2 4 or even a careless rifleman confusing teenage
was carried to obnoxious, odious extremes and the crux of the invasion of privacy
was the intrusion.
211. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 538-639. Of course, violence is not the only
aspect of government power. Moral authority supports government action. Id. at
540-41.
The potential plaintiff, as a member of the public, shares the public benefit. He
is benefitted by good government and proper conduct of its agents. Indeed, he may
be a particular victim of improper conduct. This interest may be obscured by his
desire for privacy but it exists nonetheless.
212. See Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLuM.
L. REv. 1205, 1278-82 (1976).
213. See Le Mistral v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978), (discussed note 261 infra
and accompanying text).
214. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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boys with rodents215 is not as important as the mafia.216 Even the mafia or
giant corporation cannot deploy the power of the government. Both are
subject, indeed rather amenable, to United States attorneys, local police and
even private plaintiffs supported by the judicial power. A tiny fraction of
state power is required to cabin if not eliminate these serious malefactors.
Private media interest is warranted in these activities, but private media
intrusion into private activity is not, no matter how warranted government
investigation is. The abuse of government power is especially important,
however, because government arrays the full panoply of society's power,
including legal violence, against individuals. 217
b. Preference for the Media
Once afforded access in these cases, the journalist or other media rep-
resentative occupies a special role. This special role is conferred by the gov-
ernment, which routinely grants the media special access to the scene of a
crime, to a fire or public disorder in progress, or to such routine activities
as the news conferences of public officials. Of course the media-or parts
of it-is often excluded because it may interfere with proper government
functions. Indeed, seldom can all who want access have it, but someone
selected rationally usually can.
That the media has some greater functional right of access does not give
the media an absolute right of access. The loss of privacy by an individual
may not be total. Even if it is total vis-a-vis the government, this does not
necessarily mean there is no public interest to be vindicated by governmental
prohibitions on access to private places it has entered. Both the interest in
effective government and in the vindication of personal privacy continues.
215. Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d. 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1980).
216. Hill, supra note 212, at 1278, 1282, in analyzing Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), hypothesizes infiltration of the mafia, then analyzes
the hypothesis to Dietemann and suggests no damages should be awarded for pub-
lication. Certainly, damages should be limited. See infra note 258 and accompanying
text. Presumably the exposure of actual criminal conduct is not the basis for damages.
The comparison of Dietemann and the mafia is more troubling and is a problem.
However evil the mafia, or crooked the politicians, they are private parties. Hill,
supra note 212, at 1278. It is surely tempting, as Professor Hill demonstrates, to
argue from these very serious situations to the rather insignificance of Dietemann or
of Le Mistral. My solution is to: 1) regard the government abuse as great (and it
may include the crooked politician), 2) permit media access with government control,
and 3) then let the common law rules of damage protect journalists who unveil private
rights.
217. See, e.g., Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977); Green Valley School, Inc. v. Cowles Florida Broad-
casting, 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Prahl v: Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d
130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1980).
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The clearest case, yet one subject to controversy, is when the police in making
an arrest, or police or other public officers in dealing with a major misad-
venture, would be impeded by media presence. This impediment by the media
would adversely affect not only government but those private interests the
government officers are protecting. Such a circumstance largely negates the
arguments for differential treatment of the media. The informing and check-
ing functions are of no value if they destroy or prevent that which they are
to inform about or check upon.
Thus, in State v. Lashinsky,21 1 the defendant photographer was properly
convicted of disorderly conduct when he refused to obey a lone police of-
ficer's order to leave the immediate vicinity of an accident. The victim was
severely injured, fire danger existed, the wreckage-strewn scene had to be
preserved for investigation and the crowd was difficult to control. 219 The New
Jersey Supreme Court observed that the situation must be assessed in the
light of all facts, and the defendant treated accordingly. 220 The court took
cognizance of the important media interest, but approved the police officer's
exercise of discretion. "The [police] officer virtually working alone, could
not, in his professional judgment, have permitted [even a journalist] to re-
main ... and ... discharge [the officer's] paramount responsibilities for
... safety and welfare ... ."22 This approach is correct, and the result in
its respect for the police officer's discretion is sound. 22
Stahl v. State223 presents a more complex and difficult situation. In a
brief opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, over a vigorous dissent, af-
firmed the trespass conviction of a journalist who accompanied protestors
in entering the grounds of a nuclear power plant. Conceding state action,24
the court said, "these newspersons were arrested for ... entering the grounds
in violation of a policy supported by valid considerations. Governmental
entities are empowered to regulate property under their control in order to
preserve the property for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."
218. 81 N.J. 1, 404 A.2d 1121 (1979).
219. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 1124.
220. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 1128.
221. Id.
222. The dissent argued the correct test was improperly applied. 14. at 1131
(Pashman, J., dissenting). This view neglects an important aspect of discretion, that
the decision maker may err but still be within discharge of his discretion. See Koch,
supra note 83, at 470. Of course this makes the individual defendant unhappy, but
in a case like Lashinsky the police must have the power to control the scene of an
accident. Abuse of discretion occurs when there is a lack of reasoned explanation,
adequate consideration or inconsistencies of decisions.
223. 665 P.2d 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
224. Id. at 841.
225. Id.
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The dissent protested vigorously.2 26 After finding that the plant did not
qualify as a public forum, 227 and determining that the elements of a criminal
trespass existed,2 an analysis based on state constitutional free speech and
free press protection was applied. 229 The interests of the media and the state
were balanced. 3 0 The state interest was assessed in the context of purpose
and motive. "If, in a particular case, it is found that the purpose behind the
State action is not legitimate, and is designed solely to penalize, control or
limit speech or press rights, the State must show substantial justification...
before the restriction will be upheld."231 The dissent then concluded that the
presence of the journalists (as opposed to the demonstrators) presented no
danger of adverse consequences23 2 and that the journalists themselves were
not endangered.23 The dissent also argued that the state's assessment of the
event as not being newsworthy was unavailing 4 and found no property
interest warranting the exclusion of the media. 535 Adopting the trial court's
finding, the dissent next asserted the true purpose to be control of the pres-
entation of the news. Agreeing that this was "objectionable, ignorable [sic]
and incompatible with the rights of free people,' '26 the dissent accorded this
factor substantial weight23 7 and would have found for the defendants.
The gravest shortcoming of Stahl is the lack of support for the state's
decision to arrest. The dissent correctly characterized it as being "used ar-
bitrarily and unreasonably. 238 When the media is excluded from government-
controlled property, the exclusion must be justified. In Stahl it was not.
Although the arrests might have been justified on safety or welfare grounds,
the state did not do so. The potential for abuse requires that a "hard look"
be taken by the state before it exercises its discretion to arrest the media in
order to assure that the media receives appropriate access. 3 9
3. The Doctrine Applied
When applied to some of the leading cases, the above analysis serves
well. It suggests somewhat greater protection of journalists and much more
226. Id. at 842-49 (Brett, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 846 (Brett, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 845 (Brett, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 845-46 (Brett, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 846-48 (Brett, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 846 (Brett, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 847 (Brett, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Brett, J., dissenting)
234. Id. at 848 (Brett, J., dissenting). The dissent relies on an editorial discre-
tion rationale, following Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (discussed note 183 supra).
235. Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d 839, 848 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (Brett, J.,
dissenting).
236. Id. (Brett, J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Brett, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 849 (Brett, J., dissenting).
239. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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clearly defines journalistic rights and the basis for the limits on damages.
The analysis is not necessarily consistent with that used by the Stahl court.
A clearer consideration of privacy is required than appears in the case, or is
permitted by some state law. Invasion of privacy must be regarded as a
violation of individual interests, not of property, as is trespass. This amelio-
rates the problem of causation between defendant's initial early conduct and
the major wrong. Three leading cases, two from Florida, one from Wiscon-
sin, that have been decided on trespass grounds warrant discussion.
In Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcherm the Florida Supreme Court
found customary access a defense against trespass when journalists accom-
panied officers to a fire" and later published photographs of silhouettes of
bodies. The officers encouraged the journalists to take the photographs. 2A,
The court correctly disposed of the trespass problem and gave little consid-
eration to privacy interests. Accurate reporting of a life-taking fire is un-
doubtedly protected. Further, it cannot be questioned that the reporting did
not depend on the media's entry to the premises. A story almost certainly
would have resulted even had the media been excluded. The only question
is whether the photograph of the silhouettes of the bodies, for which access
was necessary, invaded privacy. 243 Without question, the photograph was
shocking. Although objectionable, this characteristic of the photograph may
also justify its protection. The picture presumably aggravated the plaintiff's
grief. On the other hand, the fatality aspect of the story is of substantial
public interest. The greater psychological impact of the photograph, albeit
offensive to plaintiffs, furthers that interest. Since the story was obtained in
a proper fashion, the published information was accurate, and the photo-
graph added to the effectiveness of accurate information, it ought to be
protected under a privacy/media right analysis as well as under a trespass
theory.
The second Florida case, Green Valley School, Inc. v. Cowles Florida
Broadcasting, Inc.,244 decided by the Florida Court of Appeals and affirmed
without opinion by the Florida Supreme Court the same day Fletcher was
decided, must be distinguished. 24 In Green Valley the police, accompanied
240. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
241. Id. at 915.
242. Id. at 916.
243. Id. at 917.
244. 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. discharged, 340 So. 2d
1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
245. While in both cases the authorities invited the journalists, in Green Valley
a large number of police acting under color of warrant broke into plaintiff's school
and facilities late at night, whereas in Fletcher no crime was alleged on the part of
the homeowner. In Green Valley, the television crew aired accusations of criminal
conduct after watching police disrupt the area. There was no indication that such
coverage by the reporters was customary. See Florida Publishing Co., 340 So. 2d
914.
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by television journalists, raided a private school where possession of drugs
was suspected.2" Journalists accompanying the police on the raid should not,
in itself, be objectionable. As in Fletcher, the physical presence of the jour-
nalists does little harm and to some degree aids the transmission of infor-
mation to the public. The journalists undertook, however, to rearrange some
of the contents of the school before taking the photographs.2 7 This was done
with the apparent acquiescence of the police. This did harm the plaintiff. A
report on the circumstances and result of the raid would have been fully
acceptable. Adjusting the circumstances of the raid to enhance its appeal as
a bogus news item, whether by words or pictures, is not. The report, although
enhanced, is not accurate and either false light invasion of privacy or def-
amation occurs. Since the journalists themselves in Green Valley altered the
material they reported, they should be liable for damage flowing from the
alteration. The magnitude of damages would depend upon the seriousness
of the alterations of facts by the journalists, a matter which is unclear from
the case.
The outcome of Prahl v. Brosamole24" would be a more problematic
outcome. In that case, the journalists accurately reported the sheriff's view
of what charges should be preferred and prosecuted. 2A9 The view of the
sheriff, however, was not adopted by the prosecuting attorneyY 0 As a result,
the media's account was misleading if not technically incorrect. The plaintiff
objected to this error. However, the error arose not from the mere physical
presence of the journalists, but from their affirmative inquiries2-1
Among the cases where an officer is not accompanied by journalists,
Belluomo v. KAKE TV and Radio, Inc.,22 Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,25 and
Le Mistral v. Columbia Broadcasting Company s4 warrant discussion. They
illustrate varying circumstances, values and magnitude of damages and sug-
gest that the media should have little if any immunity from invasion of
privacy actions. They also demonstrate that a rule can be established and
followed with little real harm to the media's first amendment interests or to
the public. For a diligent but careful and ethical media, violations should be
rare and damages for those violations slight.
246. Green Valley, 327 So. 2d at 813.
247. Id. at 814-16.
248. 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1980).
249. Id. at 135-36, 295 N.W.2d at 773.
250. Id. at 136, 295 N.W.2d at 773.
251. Id. Upon the arrest of Dr. Prahl, the sheriff informed the reporter, Bro-
samle, that Dr. Prahl would be charged with the crime of reckless use of a weapon.
This information was used in Brosamle's broadcast. The district attorney subsequently
decided not to press charges against Dr. Prahl.
252. 3 Kan. App. 2d 461, 596 P.2d 832 (1977).
253. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
254. 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978).
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Dietemann is both the leading case and the most difficult in final res-
olution. The first essential problem of finding invasion of privacy is simple.
The journalists' fraudulent conduct, particularly when acting as police in-
formants,25 is clearly an intrusion. The entering of the plaintiffs premises
to observe his conduct betrays his confidence and invades his privacy. The
resulting disclosure of the unsavory fact that the plaintiff is a quack is equally
an invasion of privacy. The problem for the plaintiff is establishing his
damages. The reports of the defendants are accurate, so false light issues do
not arise. The disclosure of the nature of the plaintiff's enterprise, although
no doubt damaging, is trueY 6
Also, it cannot be said that the defendants' disclosure is merely unjus-
tified meddling. The disclosure of the true nature of the plaintiff's activities
is of public value, and indeed aids law enforcement. However, the journalists
did not infiltrate organized crime and expose its operations, and even these
activities are not of the magnitude of abuse of government power.2 7 Only
when an invasion of the citizen's rights by the government is likely should
journalists be permitted to enter private premises, and then only when the
government effectively controls those premises. The plaintiff has been harmed
by the media defendant without justification and should prevail. Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff's recovery should be severely circumscribed. He ought to
have no more than nominal damages and what actual damages; 8 he can
255. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 246.
256. Dietemann was exposed as a fraudulent practitioner of medicine. Id.
257. Cf. Hill, supra note 212 (organized crime is discussed). However, organ-
ized crime presents a much greater hazard to society than one person fraudulently
practicing medicine.
258. Actual damages are "such losses as are actually sustained and are sus-
ceptible of ascertainment." Western Union Tel. v. Lawson, 77 Kan. 660, 662, 72 P.
283, 284 (1903). Nominal damages "are usually considered as a small and trivial sum
awarded for a technical injury due to a violation of some legal right, and as a
consequence of which some damage must be awarded to determine the right." South-
land Co. v. Aaron, 224 Miss. 780, 786-87, 80 So. 2d 823, 826 (1955). One can conclude
that fraudulent healers are a greater social harm than less than immaculate kitchens
in restaurants and still regard it as an open question as to whether a sufficiently
substantial public interest renders defendant safe from trial. To a large extent, the
resulting story is one of human interest and this gains news value.
Control of damages is a compelling means to limit harm to media defendants.
Justice White observed in his concurring opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss, Builders, Inc.:
In New York Times, instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden of proof to
an almost impossible level, we could have achieved our stated goal by limiting
the recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly threaten the press.
Punitive damages might have been scrutinized ... or perhaps even entirely
forbidden. Presumed damages to reputation might have been prohibited, or
limited....
472 U.S. 749, 771 (1985). Aside from the discussioin herein, this Article does not
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prove. This formula appropriately punishes the journalists' wrongful conduct
and vindicates the role of the media in obtaining information.
KAKE is a fitting case for juxtaposition against Dietemann. The filming
of the plaintiff's kitchen where a health inspector found some violations is
no doubt of some value. However, the plaintiff in KAKE alleged, as the
Dietemann plaintiff apparently could not, that the plaintiff's restaurant had
good aspects which deserved reporting.2u9 Thus, the public policy reasons for
protecting the journalists in Dietemann are greatly reduced. Moreover, the
functions of informing the public about government activity or checking
government action are not really served. The entry did not occur while the
government agents performed their function, but at a later time. Although
some residual value of control of government continued to exist, it was at
a reduced level. The KAKE journalist might have determined that the health
inspection was done improperly, but this could have been done more effec-
tively if the journalist had been present during the inspection.
The KAKE court's trespass analysis renders the resulting publication
actionable. Trespass, however, is essentially an action concerning unlawful
entry to land, so its application here is strained if not an outright legal fiction.
The act of entering the plaintiff's kitchen does not lead to publication. It is
the act of intruding upon plaintiff's activity of preparing food that leads
directly-proximately if you will-to the publication and the resulting harm.
This view of the defendant's conduct as a personal rather than property
invasion greatly reduces the problem of causation, and it leads directly to a
consideration of the plaintiff's damages under a false light theory of pri-
vacy. 260
deal with this problem, but does advise the Justice's approach.
Nor should police investigation of possible violations be thought to destroy
privacy since they will not be publicized until their completion. In any case, the public
interest requires that investigations be kept secret until their culmination in order for
them to succeed. Further, in the administrative search context, the United States
Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between public and private portions of a
business. The public portions may be entered without a warrant. The private portions
may be entered only with a warrant. This corresponds to the limits of a business
invitee's access. In the absence of some indication beyond investigation, the privacy
assured against government inquiry without warrant should protect against press
intrusion as well. In addition, the act of investigating is comparatively a much less
disruptive investigation which the government undertakes. They are, even if an irri-
tant, a function of day-to-day business. They neither destroy privacy (except insofar
as government dossiers are filled and kept) nor disrupt the function of the business
nor the lives of the individuals involved. Accordingly, in these more routine types of
activities, both by the police, and fire personnel, and other personnel, the interests
of journalists would be less compelling.
259. Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 3 Kan. App. 2d 461, -, 596
P.2d 832, 840 (1977).
260. Id. at -, 596 P.2d at 840-42.
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Le Mistral is the most difficult case to clearly analyze under a privacy
theory rather than a trespass theory. The physical presence of the camera
crew in the restaurant, after being ordered to leave, 26' clearly has the capacity
to disrupt the restaurant's activity. The physical act of trespassing, without
more, harms the plaintiff. Damages for trespass, including possible punitive
damages, are thus appropriate.
Nevertheless, an action for invasion of privacy should also be available.
Just as the physical presence of the camera crew is a trespass, it is also an
intrusion into privacy. The act of filming suggests that something out of the
ordinary, or at least something interesting, is occurring. The continuation of
filming after the demand to cease suggests the occurrence is displeasing to
the plaintiff proprietor, possibly because he fears losing customers.2M
However, when viewed as either a trespass or invasion of privacy prob-
lem, Le Mistral is like KAKE. The entry does not occur when the government
agents are performing their duty, but later. Such retrospective investigation
of government action in the sanitary inspection situation is of limited value
in controlling government action.
V. CONCLUSION
The media should have under the press clause of the first amendment
a slight, functional preference beyond that of the general public for access
to places which the government controls. Ownership by the government is
the most extensive sort of control, but control also exists when places are
temporarily the site of government action requiring effective dominion by
the government. In both situations, the first amendment principle of a right
to publish is enhanced by a policy-based right to access for the media. The
policy is based on the experience of American democracy. It includes the
public's need to know for both the purposes of self-government and the need
for government power to be checked by the media. The media must be given
a slight preference over the public in order to fulfill these interests.
The media has a slight preference of access to privately-owned property
when the property is properly controlled by the government. When govern-
ment control exists, the privacy rights of the private party are greatly eroded.
The government's intrusion itself often destroys the privacy interest. If the
taking of control does not destroy the privacy right the government employees
will often know of the private interest and disclose (or be forced to disclose)
it in the course of the conduct of government affairs. This diminished private
right is insufficient to countervail against the public's receiving information
and the media's checking the function of the government. Properly under-
261. Le Mistral v. CBS, 61 A.D.2d 491, 493, 402 N.Y.S.2d815, 816 (1978).
262. Id. at 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
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stood, the idea of equality of treatment does not preclude, but rather sup-
ports, this result. In order for the media to be effectively treated equally it
must be permitted to function as the media. The decisions of the Supreme
Court which generally equate the treatment of the public and the media do
not foreclose this result. Pell v. Procunier is consistent with this theory.
KQED v. Houchins is not inconsistent and when properly analyzed supports
the idea that the media should have a slight preference over the public. The
cases in which the various media are treated differently within the first
amendment exemplify the differential treatment of equally protected entities
within the first amendment. Unless the media and the public are treated
differently in access to places cases, the media cannot function as the media,
and will effectively be denied equal treatment. The first amendment juris-
prudence permits and should be construed to require a slight functional
preference for the media over the public in access to places.
